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JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING OF POLICEGENERATED WITNESS TESTIMONY
SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON*
This Article urges a fundamental change in the administration of
criminal justice. The Article focuses on what I call “police-generated
witness testimony,” by which I mean confessions, police informants, and
eyewitness identifications. These types of testimony are leading causes of
wrongful convictions. The Article shows that heavy-handed tactics by the
police have a tendency to produce false evidence of these types, especially
when the individuals being questioned by police are particularly
vulnerable, such as juveniles or those who are intellectually disabled or
mentally ill. It also demonstrates that there are procedural best practices
that the police can follow to reduce the dangers of false evidence.
The most important feature of the Article is the proposal that courts
take an active role in ensuring the reliability of evidence in criminal trials
by invoking their gatekeeping responsibilities in screening police-generated
evidence by holding pretrial reliability hearings.
Current federal
constitutional doctrine fails to exclude patently unreliable police-generated
testimony. State high courts can invoke their state due process laws, as was
recently done in a seminal New Jersey case on eyewitness identification.
However, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 already gives trial courts broad
discretion to exclude evidence on the grounds that its potential to mislead
the jury substantially outweighs its probative value. Reliability hearings for
lay witness testimony already exist in criminal cases for some types of
evidence (mostly defense evidence), and they are also clearly required for
expert scientific evidence. Moreover, effective gatekeeping is consistent
with the objectives of the rules of evidence, not to mention ethical
requirements that judges secure the integrity of the trial process.
*
University of Houston Law Foundation Professor and Criminal Justice Institute
Director, University of Houston Law Center. The author represented the Texas public law
schools as a member of the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions for the
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wrongful convictions prove that sometimes verdicts of guilty “beyond
a reasonable doubt” are dead wrong.1 Erroneous guilty verdicts often rest
on three types of central—and often unreliable—lay witness testimony:
eyewitness identification testimony, police officer testimony regarding a
defendant’s confession, and a police informant’s2 testimony regarding a
defendant’s incriminating statements.3 Unlike other lay witness testimony,
1
As of this writing, a total of 300 men have been exonerated by means of DNA
evidence. News and Information: Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exoneration, INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_
Exonerations.php (last visited October 10, 2012). Seventeen death sentences have been
overturned on account of DNA evidence. Id. Other studies suggest that the actual numbers
of wrongful convictions, most of which cannot be discovered by means of DNA or other
exculpatory evidence, are much greater. In fact, studies suggest that thousands of people are
wrongly convicted of felonies each year. See Richard A. Wise, Clifford S. Fishman &
Martin A. Safer, How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case,
42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 440–41 (2009); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United
States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523–24 (2005).
2
This Article addresses police informants generally, as opposed to in-custody or
“jailhouse” informants, who are the sole focus of some statutes and reform proposals. The
problems surrounding the use of police informants are as important for those not in custody,
and perhaps even more so. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS
AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 177–78 (2009).
3
Misleading and false forensic evidence is also a contributing factor in a significant
number of wrongful conviction cases. See Understand the Causes: Unreliable or Improper
Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Forensic-Science-Misconduct.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). Forensic expert testimony is
already ostensibly subject to reliability screening. Thus, this article focuses only on critical
police-generated lay witness testimony.
Studying DNA exonerations allows us to learn about the extent to which eyewitness
identification, false confessions, and informant testimony seem to be recurring causes of
wrongful convictions. Erroneous eyewitness identification played a role in approximately
75% of the wrongful convictions. Understand the Causes: Eyewitness Misidentification,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/EyewitnessMisidentification.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). False confessions are present in 25% of
the cases, and false informant testimony is present in 15%. See Understanding the Causes:
False Confessions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/FalseConfessions.php (last visited October 10, 2012); Understanding the Causes: Informants,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Snitches-Informants.php
(last visited October 10, 2012). Studies have also found that perjured testimony by police
informants is a leading cause of wrongful death sentences, appearing in 45.9% of all
documented wrongful convictions by one estimate, resulting in 51 wrongfully imposed death
sentences. See CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, THE
SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT
AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3, available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongful
convictions/issues/causesandremedies/snitches/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf.
Frequently,
wrongful convictions are based on more than one source of faulty evidence at the same time.
See Understand the Causes: The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
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police-generated testimony4 in criminal cases is often rendered unreliable
by suggestive or coercive police conduct or by police incentives to lie.5
This is a critical factor that distinguishes other forms of testimonial
evidence from this type of evidence. The role of the police in procuring
these statements is a critical factor in assessing the reliability of
confessions, informant testimony, and eyewitness identifications.
In an important sense, the evidence can be viewed as the product of
the interaction between the individual, on the one hand, and the police
investigator on the other. These types of evidence are not simply “found”
in the way that a murder weapon may be found at a crime scene. Instead, a
piece of these types of police-generated witness testimony may be likened
to trace evidence, in that it must be carefully collected and processed in
order to make accurate determinations. It is the interaction of the
investigator with the individual giving statements that ultimately produces
relevant evidence, and improper handling can contaminate or destroy the
evidence.6 Extensive studies have shown the effects that certain law
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/. For a repository of information on wrongful
convictions, see id.
These causes of wrongful convictions can occur at dramatically different rates in
different kinds of cases, however. For example, erroneous identifications have been found in
almost 90% of all rape exonerations, but only half of the homicides. Gross et al., supra note
1, at 542. Since DNA evidence is present in sexual assault cases far more often than in other
types of crimes, wrongful rape convictions are far more likely to result in exonerations than
other types of crimes. Id. at 530–31. Thus, considering DNA exonerations alone gives a
skewed impression of how often mistaken identifications cause wrongful convictions. In
murder cases, for example, the more common cause appears to be deliberate false testimony
by a jailhouse snitch, the real perpetrator, or even the police or forensic scientists. Id. at
542–43. We can be certain of two things: huge numbers of wrongful convictions have
occurred, and most will never be discovered. Id. at 533.
4
For purposes of this Article, I will refer to three types of evidence—confessions,
informant testimony, and eyewitness identification testimony—as “police-generated”
evidence. There are clearly other types of testimonial evidence that may be generated by the
police, such as alibi-negating witnesses or witnesses offering forensic evidence. This Article
only compares three such types of evidence that have received the most attention from
scholars and reformers.
In addition, to avoid confusion, I do not refer to the persons making the statements that
have evidentiary value as “witnesses.” In the case of confessions and informants, it is
generally the police interrogator or informant who testifies to the incriminating statements,
not the defendant who actually makes the incriminating statements. Thus, the “witness” in
the case of confessions or informants is the police officer or informant. With eyewitness
identifications, the person making the statements is also the witness in court.
5
See infra Part II.A.
6
The memories of eyewitnesses are extremely fragile and easily distorted by improper
police practices. See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. The interrogation process
can also “contaminate” the evidence of a suspect’s statements if interrogators feed details of
the crime to the suspect who then repeats them back to the interrogators. In the case of
particularly vulnerable suspects, these details may become part of the suspect’s false
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enforcement practices can have in rendering police-generated witness
testimony of these three types unreliable.7 Reliability concerns have even
led a few jurisdictions to prohibit death sentences based solely on these
types of evidence.8 Thus, a major contribution of this Article is to
catalogue the ways in which all three of these types of prosecution evidence
can be rendered substantially more unreliable by strong-armed police
tactics, especially when they are employed against individuals who are
particularly vulnerable, such as minors and the intellectually disabled or
mentally ill.
A number of proposals have called on trial courts to play a
gatekeeping role for police-generated witness testimony that mirrors the
role they ostensibly play in screening scientific evidence for reliability as
outlined by the Supreme Court in Daubert.9 Just as with forensic evidence,
memories that are created during the interrogations. See infra note 68. The gathering of
information from potential informants can also produce contaminated evidence if the
informant is told the details of the crime for which the police seek testimony. See infra notes
76–81 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 143–80 and accompanying text.
8
Illinois had a unique provision that allowed a trial court to decertify a case as a capital
case “if the court finds that the only evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction is the
uncorroborated testimony of an informant witness . . . concerning the confession or
admission of the defendant or that the sole evidence against the defendant is a single
eyewitness or single accomplice without any other corroborating evidence.” 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/9-1(h-5) (2011). The provision is no longer needed in Illinois since the death
penalty was recently repealed.
See Illinois Pub. Act 096-1543, available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=096-1543. Nonetheless, the
corroborating evidence requirement provides a useful exemplar.
In Maryland, a person may not be sentenced to death based solely on the testimony of
eyewitnesses. The State must present the court or jury with “(i) biological evidence or DNA
evidence that links the defendant to the act of murder; (ii) a videotaped, voluntary
interrogation and confession of the defendant to the murder; or (iii) a video recording that
conclusively links the defendant to the murder.” MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. L. § 2-202(a)(3)
(LexisNexis 2011). See also Michael Millemann, Limiting Death: Maryland’s New Death
Penalty, 70 MD. L. REV. 272, 272 (2010) (describing Maryland’s death penalty laws as the
most restrictive in the country).
9
See infra notes 236–45 and accompanying text. Daubert announced judicial
gatekeeping to ensure the reliability of scientific evidence. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 536 U.S. 137 (1999)
(applying Daubert reliability standard to expert witnesses offering technical evidence). In
the civil context, Joseph Sanders views Daubert as evidence that American courts have
“taken smaller steps toward reducing the untoward effects of the adversarial selection of
witnesses” and “pushed courts in the United States toward a slightly more inquisitorial
posture . . . . The era of a totally passive judiciary slowly ended after the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and, since Daubert, the federal judiciary and the courts in many
states have adopted a more active, inquisitorial posture in assessing the quality of a party’s
experts.” Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert Witness, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 63, 78 (2009).
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there are best practices for gathering and preserving these types of evidence.
Laboratory protocols guide the scientist, and standardized protocols can
guide law enforcement in gathering and preserving eyewitness
identification evidence, confessions during custodial interrogations, and the
use of police informants.10 If investigators “contaminate” the evidence by
using suggestive or coercive practices, it is within the province of the trial
judge to exclude the resulting evidence as too unreliable or to devise a less
drastic intermediate remedy.
Unfortunately, the analogy to scientific evidence—another common
cause of wrongful convictions—suffers from the fact that trial courts
generally have either been unwilling or unable to perform competent
reliability screening in criminal cases.11 To be fair, reliability in the context
of scientific evidence presents a more challenging task for courts.12
Evaluating the scientific validity of a proposed expert’s testimony involves
a complex assessment of the established scientific theory, the accepted
protocols for obtaining such evidence, and the applicability of the science to
the facts of the case at bar.13 Scientific expertise also comes in a myriad of
10

See infra Part II.B. On the social science of eyewitness identification, see also Sandra
Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness
Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1497–1506 (2008) [hereinafter
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?].
On confessions, see RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE
INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 237–68 (2008). On informant testimony,
sociologists have done more limited research. See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 40, 111.
11
Concerns about the failures of Daubert in criminal cases and the admission of
unreliable forensic evidence abound. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE
FORENSIC SCIENCE CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS. ET AL.,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009)
(finding that a wide range of forensic disciplines lack validity) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE]; Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 2, 89–90 (2009) (reporting that
invalid forensic science was offered in 82 of 137 (60%) of wrongful convictions studied;
courts typically admit prosecution forensic evidence in a highly deferential manner and do
not provide funds for defense experts). These concerns have also prompted the suggestion
that perhaps judges should share the decisionmaking authority for forensic science with
experts in those fields. See Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance,
Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 897 (2008).
12
“Surveys and case law have demonstrated that judges have a poor judicial
understanding of the Daubert factors, which in many ways requires an unrealistic working
knowledge of the philosophy of science.” Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research
in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L. J. 1263, 1270 (2007).
13
As Daubert explains, courts are required to evaluate the proposed testimony to
determine whether it is supported by valid scientific principles. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–
90. This involves a determination of whether the science is generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community, whether the results of the testing have been published for peer
review, whether they are falsifiable, and the error rate. Id. at 593–94. In addition, the court
must evaluate the technique used to put the scientific principles into practice. Are there valid
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varieties, and each type of evidence requires the court to assess reliability
on numerous, complex levels.14 Not surprisingly, grave concerns about the
unscientific nature of much forensic evidence admitted by courts persist.15
It hardly makes sense to propose expanding on a failed model of
reliability screening. However, courts are better suited to conduct reliability
screening for police-generated lay witness testimony. The term “reliability”
as used here means simply accuracy, and it operates in reference to the trial
outcome. Determining reliability in relation to confessions, eyewitness
identifications, and informant testimony involves a probabilistic assessment
of the extent to which a variety of factors known to diminish the accuracy
of these types of evidence are present in a given case. Judges can simply
compare the police procedures followed in the case to state-of-the-art best
practices that have been developed by law enforcement groups and
reformers. A reliability assessment would also necessarily take into
account any vulnerability factors, and other intrinsic factors pertaining to
the individuals interviewed, that are known to reduce the likely accuracy of
the statement given.16
Traditionally, trial courts hold pretrial hearings for confessions and
eyewitness identification evidence, but only to determine whether it was
obtained in accordance with the defendant’s constitutional rights. These
hearings have not been effective in ensuring the reliability of the evidence.17
A new landmark decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court sets a new
course for its state due process analysis of eyewitness identifications by
protocols in the field? Were the protocols followed? Next, the court must evaluate the
manner in which the results are interpreted and explained to the jury. Are the conclusions
drawn by the expert empirically based? Finally, the court must determine whether the
proposed evidence is sufficiently relevant in terms of “fit.” Does the evidence support an
issue in question in the case? Id. at 591. It goes without saying that a witness’s credentials
also must be assessed for adequate expertise. See also Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 11, at
7–8 (noting that in addition to validity of a particular forensic technique, data must also be
interpreted, reported, and testified to within appropriate scientific parameters that are
supported by empirical data).
14
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93.
15
See supra note 11.
16
With regard to both confessions and statements from police informants, for example,
individuals who are juveniles, intellectually disabled, or mentally ill have been shown to be
more susceptible to making false statements than others. See infra notes 69–75 and
accompanying text. Likewise, for eyewitnesses, researchers have shown that many factors,
such as an eyewitness’s age, mental ability, and stress level during the crime, and other
factors like differences in race between eyewitness and culprit, can affect the ability of the
eyewitness to make an accurate identification. See infra notes 106–15 and accompanying
text. Some cases may present the “perfect storm” of both particularly vulnerable individuals
and highly suggestive or coercive police practices, posing an extremely high likelihood of
unreliability.
17
See infra Part III.A.
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requiring pretrial reliability hearings of the type advocated here.18 This
opinion can serve as a template for other states in vastly improving the
screening of identification evidence and the use of jury instructions. It also
sets an important precedent in that it departs entirely from a failed federal
constitutional test for police-generated lay witness testimony. It lays the
responsibility for reliability assessment squarely at the feet of the judiciary
as a protection for the innocent against wrongful conviction. In this broader
sense, it lays the groundwork for a similar departure from the federal
voluntariness test for confessions and the development of judicial reliability
screening for informant testimony.
However, state trial courts need not wait for the supreme courts in
their states to follow the New Jersey high court’s lead. The state
counterparts to the Federal Rules of Evidence also govern reliability.
Traditionally, we would look to the hearsay rules to guard against the use of
unreliable hearsay statements. However, the hearsay rules were drafted
long before the advent of DNA exonerations brought to light the potential
unreliability of police-generated evidence. For most hearsay, the rules
require proof of certain indicia of reliability. In contrast, the rules freely
admit confessions, eyewitness identifications, and informant testimony
without any reliability screening.19
Fortunately, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence showed the
foresight to know that specific rules might not always provide sufficient
protection against evidence that might lead to an inaccurate verdict by
misleading or confusing the jury or unfairly prejudicing a party.20 Thus,
Rules 701 and 403 vest trial courts with broad discretion to determine
whether evidence offered by a lay witness is inadmissible on the grounds
that it presents a high risk of unreliability that may lead to an inaccurate
verdict. This approach is consistent with the traditional role of the trial
judge as evidentiary gatekeeper under Rule 104(a) as well. As our
understanding of the dangers of a particular type of evidence may change,
the rules should be adapted to meet the challenges presented by this new
information. The “purpose and construction” provision of the rules calls on
courts to interpret the rules over time so as to “promote the development of
evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just
determination.”21
Courts have not traditionally held pretrial reliability hearings. Instead,
the practice is to leave it to the jury to “find the facts” based on “witness
18
19
20
21

See infra notes 316–25 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 275–92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 269–72 and accompanying text.
FED. R. EVID. 102.
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credibility,” among other things.22 Witness “credibility” refers to the
witness’s truthfulness. However, eyewitnesses who misidentify an innocent
suspect and police officers who testify to a suspect’s false confession
usually give truthful testimony. These witnesses actually believe that the
defendant is guilty. The witnesses are “credible” in that they are not lying,
but their testimony is nonetheless incorrect. Juries generally do not
appreciate the ways in which certain police tactics can cause an eyewitness
to make an honest mistake or to feel pressured to identify a certain person,
honestly convincing himself of the defendant’s guilt.23 Jurors also
generally do not understand how other tactics can cause an innocent person
to confess falsely.24 Similarly, jurors have been shown to be generally
ineffective at evaluating the reliability of police informants because they do
not appreciate the government incentives or coercion likely to cause
informants to lie, nor do they appreciate the vulnerability of some
informants in the face of police pressure.
Pretrial reliability hearings would transform the judicial role from one
of passively admitting what may be patently unreliable evidence to one that
involves actively scrutinizing the process by which the police have
generated the witness testimony. Jurors already understand that trial courts
rule on the admissibility of evidence, so freely admitting police-generated
witness testimony may be assumed to indicate a judicial imprimatur, giving
jurors a false belief that the judge considers the evidence reliable.
Moreover, the reliability of police-generated witness testimony cannot
properly be screened during a trial by a jury. The issues are better suited to
a pretrial hearing regarding the conditions under which police interviewed
the individual, as well as other reliability factors. As an institutional matter,
judges through training and experience can develop the required expertise
that jurors—who are not regular participants in the trial process—cannot.25
Finally, it fits within the adjudicative model already in place for judges
to pass on the reliability of police-generated evidence. Courts already grant
pretrial hearings to consider constitutional challenges to confessions and

22

See generally JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 25–44 (2006) (discussing the fact-finding role of the jury
and the role of the judge in determining questions of law).
23
See infra note 303 and accompanying text.
24
See infra notes 303–04 and accompanying text.
25

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., argued in his classic work, The Common Law, that even though
facts “do not often repeat themselves in practice,” yet “cases with comparatively small variations
from each other do,” and when this happens, “A judge who has long sat at nisi prius ought
gradually to acquire a fund of experience which enables him to represent the common sense of
the community in ordinary instances far better than an average jury.”

OLDHAM, supra note 22, at 41.
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identifications,26 as well as the reliability of scientific evidence27 and
problematic types of lay witness testimony.28 Moreover, reliability
determinations do not interfere with a defendant’s right to a jury trial,29 but
rather they would advance the defendant’s right to a fair jury trial.
The judiciary carries a heightened responsibility to oversee the
reliability of police-generated witness testimony for several reasons. For
one thing, the many discoveries of wrongful convictions, through DNA
evidence and otherwise, expose only the “tip of an iceberg.”30 Wrongful
convictions scholars have generally agreed that the occurrence of wrongful
convictions is almost certainly much higher than the occurrence of
exonerations and that we do not have the means to uncover most of the
wrongful convictions that occur.31 Convictions based on governmentgenerated witness testimony—now shown to falsely convict scores of
innocents—impose on the state a new obligation to perform more rigorous
screening for reliability, and that duty naturally falls to the courts.32 Rule
104(a) outlines the basic duty of trial courts to determine the admissibility
of evidence,33 and Rule 403 grants courts the discretion to exclude evidence
that carries a grave risk of misleading the jury.34 Under these rules, courts
have the discretion to engage in reliability gatekeeping, especially in light
of the fact that these particular types of evidence are heavily influenced by
the police procedures that generate them.35 State high courts can invoke

26

See infra note 182 and accompanying text; infra Part III.A.
See supra note 13; infra notes 257–63 and accompanying text.
28
See infra Part III.B.
29
A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine the elements of the
crime, including any fact that increases the maximum punishment. See OLDHAM, supra note
22, at 39–40. Reliability assessments either accrue to the advantage of the defendant by
excluding evidence, or they admit the evidence and allow the jury to make the ultimate
decision. Thus, by ruling on reliability the courts would not take from the jury the authority
to find the defendant guilty.
30
See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 62 (2008).
31
See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1491.
32
See D. Michael Risinger, Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to
Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991, 1020 (2010) (“Viewing the state as having
more responsibility for harm done directly to the immediate subjects of its acts than for harm
done indirectly by its failures to act [i.e., to convict the guilty], or by its choices to act one
way rather than another, has a long tradition, especially in situations where the latter harm is
done by the subsequent choice of an independent human agent.”). For an article calling for
heightened reliability review at the appellate level, see Keith A. Findley, Innocence
Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591 (2009).
33
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (explaining
the trial judge’s responsibility to assess expert scientific testimony under 104(a)).
34
See id. at 595; see also infra Part IV.B.
35
See infra Parts IV.B–D.
27
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their state due process clauses as well.36 Legislatures can play an important
role in guiding that discretion by defining and prioritizing the factors courts
should consider.37
It bears mention that vigorous reliability screening for policegenerated witness testimony by trial courts does not threaten the viability of
large numbers of prosecution cases.38 While confessions, informant
testimony, and identification evidence are leading causes of wrongful
convictions, in the vast majority of cases the identification of the
perpetrator and the particular details of the crime are not in doubt. Large
categories of crimes occur in cases involving people who know each other,
such as domestic violence cases, or where people are caught red-handed,
such as drunk-driving and undercover drug cases. These types of cases—
over 90% of all felonies—tend to be resolved by guilty pleas.39 It is only in
the truly uncertain cases, which comprise a small minority of the total
caseload, that confession, informant, and eyewitness evidence will require
reliability assessments. These are the cases that tend to go to trial and in
which defendants often reject otherwise lenient plea offers.40 In one study
of the first 200 DNA exonerations, with the exception of nine defendants
who pled guilty, all the rest were found guilty after trial.41 Any serious
effort to curb wrongful convictions would focus on reforming the
investigative and trial practices in this small subset of cases.
Part II of this article demonstrates what I call the “unreliability
conundrum” in criminal prosecutions. Students of the problem are now
familiar with the fact that these three types of testimonial evidence—
confessions, eyewitness identifications, and police informant testimony—
often lead to wrongful convictions. Yet the law remains unsettled on how
best to respond. Surely not every eyewitness identification, confession, or
police informant is unreliable, but many are. Calls for strict enforcement of

36
See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications and State Courts as
Guardians Against Wrongful Conviction, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 621–31 (2010)
[hereinafter Eyewitness Identifications].
37
See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 194 (stating that the Illinois statute lists seven
reliability factors).
38
See Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143,
147 (2011).
39
Id. This is not to say that a guilty plea assures the actual guilt of the defendant. The
mass exonerations in Tulia, Texas, and the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles involved
hundreds of innocent people who were deliberately framed by corrupt police officers, and
almost all of them pled guilty. See Russell D. Covey, Mass Exoneration Data and the
Causes of Wrongful Convictions (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1881767.
40
Simon, supra note 38, at 152.
41
See Garrett, supra note 30, at 74.
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scientifically proven best practices for the police run up against a strong
resistance from many within law enforcement.42 This part of the Article
surveys the research on each of these three types of evidence so as to better
understand the unreliability of each, focusing especially on the ways in
which the police can exacerbate the unreliability. It also addresses the
proposed protocols advanced by scholars and advocacy groups for each of
the three areas and the extent to which the legal system has implemented
them.
Among the proposals put forth by academics and advocacy groups is
the proposal that trial courts expand their judicial gatekeeping role to
include pretrial reliability reviews of police-generated witness testimony.
Part III of the paper examines the support for such pretrial hearings in the
rules of evidence and Supreme Court case law. It also reviews two types of
lay witness testimony in which courts already conduct reliability hearings—
the testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses and young child witnesses
in sexual assault cases. Courts have recognized that certain safeguards
should normally be followed in conducting out-of-court interviews with
witnesses undergoing hypnosis and with child victims. Interestingly, these
recommended procedures bear remarkable similarity to those proposed for
obtaining police-generated witness testimony. Thus, there is significant,
instructive precedent for holding pretrial reliability hearings for important
prosecution lay witness testimony.
Finally, in Part IV, the Article argues that trial courts should conduct
pretrial reliability hearings for police-generated witness testimony. This
Part then outlines the various considerations that courts might take into
account in evaluating the reliability of the three types of evidence
addressed, using the New Jersey decision on pretrial hearings for
eyewitness identifications as a model.
This section explains the
appropriateness of judicial screening of critical lay witness testimony.
Judges have an ethical obligation to safeguard the integrity of the trial
process, and they are best situated to develop the necessary expertise in
these areas of law. Moreover, passing on reliability does not infringe on the

42

See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1494 (addressing police resistance
to changes imposed from outside law enforcement); cf. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents
Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 761, 765 (2007) (addressing resistance to new evidence of innocence by some
judges and prosecutors); Gross et al., supra note 1, at 525–26 (citing examples of “state
officials who continue to express doubt about the innocence of exonerated defendants,
sometimes in the face of extraordinary evidence”). See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The
Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 125, 129–31, 150, 157–59 (2004) (examining the institutional and political incentives
that cause prosecutors to resist claims of innocence).
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jury’s fact-finding role, a role designed to operate for the defendant’s
benefit.
II. THE UNRELIABILITY CONUNDRUM
The criminal justice system in the United States adheres to an
adversarial model for investigation and prosecution.43 Government agents
seek to discover criminal wrongdoers and bring them to justice so as to
keep their communities safe and provide solace to victims. Arrests and
convictions take on a special importance as indicators of success in an
adversarial model of criminal investigation.44
Some scholars have recognized the dangers of an adversarial model of
criminal investigation. For example, the wrongful convictions literature has
highlighted the psychological phenomenon of “tunnel vision” that can occur
once police investigators come to believe in a particular suspect’s guilt.45
For complex, psychological reasons, police investigators can become blind
to evidence inconsistent with a suspect’s guilt, and they have a tendency to
interpret other evidence as supporting their suspect’s guilt.46 In an
adversarial investigative model, a defense attorney is considered a
hindrance to the police, rather than a person who can assist the police in
reaching the right result. The police will have little interest in sharing
information with a defendant or a defense attorney. In fact, the police will
be eager to gather their evidence to the greatest extent possible without the
involvement of a defense attorney.47 Institutional pressures can also lead
prosecutors to develop tunnel vision about the guilt of persons arrested by
the police.48 In an adversarial system, police and prosecutors control how
an investigation is conducted, as well as access to relevant evidence,
thereby putting wrongly accused persons at a serious disadvantage in trying
to clear their names.49 Keith Findley astutely observes that:

43

New concerns about protecting the innocent have caused several scholars to write
critically of the American adversarial system of law enforcement. See, e.g., Mary Sue
Backus, The Adversary System is Dead; Long Live the Adversary System: The Trial Judge as
the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 945, 945–50; Findley, supra
note 11, at 900.
44
See Findley, supra note 11, at 899 (addressing “[i]nstitutional pressures . . . to catch
and convict . . . criminals” and “unrealistic public and media expectations . . . in the wake of
violent and sensationalized crimes”).
45
For the definitive article on the topic, see Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 291.
46
Id. at 326–27.
47
See Findley, supra note 11, at 898; Findley & Scott, supra note 45, at 323–27.
48
See Findley, supra note 11, at 898–900.
49
Id. at 898.

2012]

POLICE-GENERATED TESTIMONY

341

While initial investigations must be handled by police, a system that is truly interested
in protecting the innocent and finding the truth would not make police an arm of the
prosecution. Instead, police might be made neutral inquisitors who work for the court
or both parties, and not just the prosecution. Police investigative files and crime scene
evidence would then be made fully available . . . to both parties, with appropriate
safeguards to protect the safety of sensitive sources of information or the integrity of
ongoing investigations. Some European countries do just that—they make the police
50
investigative file fully available to both sides.

Similar concerns about the adversarial nature of evidence gathering in
the American criminal justice system have moved some to call for greater
independence of forensic scientists from law enforcement as a means of
improving the reliability of forensic evidence.51 Unfortunately, the
American adversarial system of criminal justice presents other hazards for
the innocent, including unequal resources—in particular, access to experts
and the quality of representation for indigents.52 In short, criminal
investigations that become motivated to build a case against a particular
individual present grave risks to the wrongly accused.
The studies of each of the types of evidence addressed here—
eyewitness identifications, confessions, and police informant testimony—
show that each is derived by the police during the initial stages of the
adversary process. There are two important dynamics that can operate
simultaneously, often producing false statements. First, the police may
attempt to obtain the statements after they have identified a suspect as a
means of substantiating their case, rather than seeking the statements as a
starting point in an investigation.53 Police investigators who believe that
they know the identity of the guilty person will engage in a conversation
with a person (an eyewitness, a suspect, or a potential informant),54 often
using suggestive or coercive means, in order to obtain the desired
evidence.55 Second, the persons whose statements are obtained by the
police may be vulnerable individuals who are more susceptible to
suggestive, misleading, or coercive police behavior. 56 The combination of
the two—police interviewers who believe they have the “correct” answers
50

Id. at 900.
See generally STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 11 (discussing the
challenges currently facing the forensic community, including the lack of validity in many
forensic disciplines).
52
See Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local
Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 300–01 (2010).
53
See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 45, at 334 (“[A]n interrogation is conducted only
when the investigator is reasonably certain of the suspect’s guilt.” (quoting FRED E. INBAU ET
AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 8 (2001))).
54
See infra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
55
See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
56
See infra notes 69–75, 82, 106–08 and accompanying text.
51
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in mind when they interview individuals and individuals who are
particularly vulnerable to police suggestion or pressure—leads quite
predictably to false answers.
Herein lies the reliability conundrum for the legal system: in many
instances, police-generated witness testimony is reliable, but in other cases
these critical types of evidence lead to wrongful convictions. Researchers
have identified the police practices and other factors that affect the
reliability of these types of evidence, and have made suggestions for
improved police practices.57
The following sections address the literature on the three types of
police-generated testimonial evidence discussed here. Each can create a
risk of wrongful convictions due to the psychological vulnerability of the
individuals questioned by the police, combined with the suggestive or
coercive questioning practices of the police. This part of the Article also
reviews the best practices for improving the reliability of these types of
evidence.
A. PSYCHOLOGICALLY VULNERABLE INDIVIDUALS, DETERMINED
INVESTIGATORS, AND A PROCESS HIDDEN FROM JUDICIAL
SCRUTINY

When a serious crime occurs, the police look for leads and try to
determine who committed the crime. For assistance, they turn to
individuals such as eyewitnesses, “persons of interest,” suspected
accomplices, low-level criminals from the same community, or cellmates of
a suspect in the county jail.
Custodial interrogation, eyewitness
identifications, and informant information are the means by which
investigators build their cases.
Once the police arrest a suspect,
eyewitnesses can verify the arrest decision by making a positive
identification. To obtain identification evidence, the police ordinarily
conduct a lineup or photo array to see if the eyewitness can choose the
suspect from the choices provided.58 Alternatively, with on-the-scene
arrests, the police may conduct a “show up” in which the suspect is the only

57
Reformers have also advocated the use of pretrial reliability hearings. See infra notes
237–40 and accompanying text.
58
Studies of identification practices show that the police generally use these procedures
only after they have targeted a particular person as a “suspect.” See, e.g., Bruce W. Behrman
& Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival
Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 475–478 (2001) (providing archival analysis of real
cases and various factors that affected “suspect identification rates,” or rates at which
eyewitnesses identified persons who police had singled out as suspects).
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person shown to the eyewitness.59 Once a suspect is in custody, the police
can interrogate the arrestee to obtain incriminating statements.60 They may
also offer incentives to known criminals who may share a jail cell with the
suspect.61 All of these encounters produce important testimonial evidence
for the prosecution.
Richard Leo emphasizes that the American system of police
interrogation must be understood as an early phase of the adversary system
and not simply as a neutral fact-finding process.62 Leo’s review of
empirical studies of police detectives shows them to be “anything but
neutral or impartial in their collection and construction of case evidence
against criminal suspects during the interrogation process.”63 The same can
be said of the process of eyewitness identification64 and the use of
informants.65 Each of these investigative methods too often becomes an
occasion for individuals to confirm the investigators’ beliefs about a certain
suspect’s guilt, or simply to provide usable evidence to convict an arrestee,
rather than being part of a neutral search for truth. Rather than one-on-one
conversations between equals, the research shows these investigative
processes to be police-dominated sessions in which officers use various
psychological methods of suggestion, persuasion, or coercion.

59

Sandra Guerra Thompson, What Price Justice? The Importance of Costs to Eyewitness
Identification Reform, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 53–54 (2008) [hereinafter What Price
Justice?] (noting that show-ups may be the most commonly used identification procedure).
60
A person is considered to be in police “custody” if that person “has been . . . deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966). A lawful arrest is justified on the basis of probable cause to believe the person is
guilty of a crime. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 91 (1964)). Following arrest, the police may engage in a custodial interrogation so as to
gather sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
449–50.
61
See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 27–29 (addressing the rewards, such as leniency, cash,
and even illicit drugs offered to informants who have access to higher level targets of police
investigations).
62
See generally LEO, supra note 10, at 9–40.
63
Id. at 11.
64
Typically, the police use photo arrays or live lineups as a means of having an
eyewitness confirm the identification of a suspect who is already in police custody or who is
a target of the investigation. Scientists analogize these identification procedures to scientific
experiments. In these experiments, “[p]olice investigators are like researchers who have a
hypothesis (i.e., that the suspect is the culprit), the officer conducting the lineup is like an
experimenter who administers the materials and ‘runs,’ the eyewitness through the procedure
. . . .” Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research
and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765–67 (1995).
65
See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 17–21 (addressing relationship of informant to police
officer in investigating crimes).
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When suspects confess falsely, they most often do so “in response to
police coercion, stress, or pressure in order to achieve some instrumental
benefit—typically either to terminate and thus escape from an aversive
interrogation process, to take advantage of a perceived suggestion or
promise of leniency, or to avoid an anticipated harsh punishment.”66 The
combination of a highly stressful atmosphere in the interrogation room and
a promise of leniency can wear a suspect down and manipulate him into
confessing.67 In addition, police may also use pressure, tricks, lies, fear, or
other tactics to convince a person to make incriminating statements that
may turn out to be false.68
The vulnerability of certain types of suspects increases the likelihood
of a false confession as well. Juveniles,69 the mentally ill,70 and the

66

LEO, supra note 10, at 201–02; see also, e.g., State v. Strayhand, 911 P.2d 577, 583
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (describing interaction between two police detectives and a suspect
where the police threatened to “hang [the suspect] in court” and that he would do some “big
time” if he was not cooperative, ignored his request to stop being questioned, accused him of
lying, and then lied about having a lab report that showed his fingerprints were on the
vehicle used in the robbery).
67
LEO, supra note 10, at 148.
68
Id. at 132–50, 201–04. One study of cases in which innocent individuals were
wrongly convicted and later exonerated through DNA evidence found that police had fed the
facts and details of the crime to the innocent suspects and then reported that the suspects had
provided these same facts and details as part of their confessions. See Garrett, supra note 30,
at 89–90. Another scholar provides evidence of police dishonesty as testifying witnesses, in
covering up their wrongdoing, as part of the interrogation process, and even in fabricating
evidence against innocent people. See Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police
Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010). She proposes an exclusionary rule for unjustified
“truth-distorting” police lies as a means of protecting the innocent from wrongful
convictions. Id. at 45–46.
69
See LEO, supra note 10, at 231–33. See generally Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff,
Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257
(2007) (arguing that problems of false confessions and mistaken identifications by juveniles,
when combined with procedural shortcomings of juvenile courts, create a heightened risk of
wrongful conviction); Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions:
Adolescent Development and Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53 (2007)
(addressing suggestibility of children during interrogation, noting relevance of research on
children as witnesses and victims, and recommending reforms including prohibiting
coercive, deceptive, or suggestive questioning, as well as videotaping).
70
Mentally ill persons may confess falsely even without the use of coercive or
suggestive practices. Regardless of the reason, it is clear that the confessions of the mentally
ill are not generally reliable. See Claudio Salas, Note: The Case for Excluding the Criminal
Confessions of the Mentally Ill, 2004 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243, 268–69 (arguing for
exclusion of all confessions by the mentally ill or mentally disabled persons who are not
capable of comprehending the Miranda warnings); see also BRANDON L. GARRETT,
Characteristics of Informant Testimony in DNA Exoneration Cases, in CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG ch. 5, app. (2011), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/convicting_the_innocent/garrett_informants_
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intellectually disabled71 have been shown to be more susceptible to coercive
or deceptive tactics by the police during custodial interrogation. A recent
study of youths who have been exonerated by DNA evidence showed that
of the 103 youth exonerees, 31.1% had falsely confessed.72 In another
study, 43% of all DNA exonerees were mentally ill, mentally retarded, or
borderline mentally retarded.73 For a variety of reasons, intellectually
disabled suspects may become compliant with the interrogator and willing
to say what the interrogator wants to hear.74 After lengthy interrogations
they can even become confused and persuaded to believe they are in fact
guilty.75
With police informants, the typical image is that of a wily criminal
who would commit perjury to obtain a benefit for himself. The police may
be faulted for facilitating the perjury by offering some type of reward for
the testimony, but they cannot necessarily be faulted for generating the
testimony. However, there is another scenario in which the use of police
informants mirrors the interrogation process. Police, or even prosecutors,
may initiate similar government-dominated interviews with potential
informants as a means of generating evidence about certain individuals they
believe to be guilty. Police may attempt to pressure potential informants to
“cooperate” by means of various types of inducements, including threats of
incarceration or deportation, if they refuse to provide information.76
appendix.pdf (quoting conflicting and vague victim-eyewitness testimony by psychiatric
patient in case where defendant, Mark Bravo, was exonerated).
71
See generally Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution,
Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495 (2002) (presenting
empirical study showing that mentally retarded suspects do not comprehend the Miranda
warnings that are designed to protect them and that they have a proclivity to confess falsely).
72
Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider & Lynda M. Tricarico, Arresting Development:
Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 904–05 (2010). The study of 103
DNA exonerees who were juveniles showed that while 31.1% of all youth exonerees falsely
confessed, only 17.8% of the 214 adult exonerees had falsely confessed. In addition, the
study found that the incidence of false confessions increases as the age of the child
decreases; of the eleven- to fourteen-year-olds in the study, over half had confessed falsely.
Id.
73
See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051,
1064 (2010).
74
See LEO, supra note 10 at 231–34 (discussing the reasons that vulnerable suspects may
falsely incriminate themselves, including: the effects of low cognitive abilities on their
susceptibility to manipulation and deception, becoming easily overwhelmed by stress,
having low self-esteem, being eager to please authority figures, and having distorted
perceptions due to mental illness).
75
Id. at 210–11, 231–33.
76
See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 90 (detailing the facts in United States v. White,
No. CRIM.A.04-20047-01-K, 2004 WL 2182188, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2004), in which a
police officer threatened to bring multiple charges and take the individual to jail if he did not
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Alexandra Natapoff writes of the process of “creating informants” as one
that “involves the purposeful manipulation of their vulnerability.”77
Informants may be psychologically vulnerable to police pressure due
to a variety of conditions similar to those observed in the context of
interrogations. Natapoff explains the “lopsided power dynamics of the way
informants are often created in the first place.”78 Rather than wily
negotiators who bargain for rewards on equal footing with the police,
“[i]nformants can be the most defenseless players in the criminal justice
drama—those without counsel or education, those with substance abuse
problems, or those who are otherwise susceptible to official pressure.”79 It
is not uncommon for informants to be juveniles.80 The fear of criminal
punishment and other psychological disadvantages of potential informants
will often induce them to lie in order to obtain the promised leniency or
other rewards.81
Even informants without innate vulnerabilities may be susceptible to
offers of substantial rewards or threats of punishment. The question would
be whether the incentives offered by law enforcement were so great as to
create an unacceptable likelihood that any person would be tempted to
commit perjury to gain the benefit or avoid the punishment.82
Eyewitnesses conjure up yet another image of police encounters. The
stereotypical eyewitness is the good citizen who is a crime victim or simply

cooperate); see also id. at 27–29 (noting that leniency is the most common reward used, but
others include monetary payment, relocation, new jobs and identities, and even illegally
provided drugs or permission to engage in criminal conduct). For data on informant
testimony regarding rewards offered to them at the trials of persons who were later
exonerated by DNA evidence, see GARRETT, supra note 70, ch. 5, app.
77
NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 40. She quotes a former narcotics agent who bluntly
explains:
It is a widely accepted fact that individuals are most vulnerable to becoming cooperative
immediately following arrest . . . . [I] learned to “strike” while the “iron is hot.” Informants will
often rethink their exposure and decide not to cooperate if given too much time to contemplate
their decision. However, a night or two in jail can work for the investigator to help the informant
decide to cooperate.

Id.
78

Id.
Id.
80
See Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Damage? Juvenile Snitches in America’s “Wars” on
Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1171–75, 1181–83 (2009)
(addressing the harms and dangers to children from acting as police informants and
advocating for an approach that requires government agents to adopt the best-interests-ofthe-child standard when using a child as an informant).
81
Id. at 40–41.
82
The test would be similar to the elements of an entrapment defense. See generally
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 9.8(a), at 530–34 (5th ed. 2010).
79
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an eyewitness to a crime. The police will initially ask the eyewitness to
describe the culprit and, following an investigation, will ask the eyewitness
to try to identify a possible suspect. There is growing public awareness that
eyewitnesses can be notoriously unreliable in identifying a stranger who
committed a crime in their presence. Their primary disadvantage is the
simple fact that most human beings lack the ability to develop and retain
accurate memories of the faces of strangers; this deficiency is most acute
when witnesses view those individuals under the typical circumstances in
which serious stranger-on-stranger crimes are committed.83
The police can compound any preexisting unreliability of an
eyewitness’s identification by using suggestive, or even coercive,
procedures.84 In the zeal to build a case, a determined investigator can
manipulate the collection of eyewitness testimony and cause a witness to
select the wrong person; an investigator can also give positive feedback that

83

See, e.g., LOFTUS, infra 136–37 (observing that “[i]t seems to be a fact—it has been
observed so many times—that people are better at recognizing faces of people of their own
race than a different race”); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE & JENNIFER E. DYSART,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 106–08 (4th ed. 2007); Kenneth A.
Deffenbacher, Estimating the Impact of Estimator Variables on Eyewitness Identification: A
Fruitful Marriage of Practical Problem Solving and Psychological Theorizing, 22 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 815, 819–22 (2008) (discussing studies of effects of heightened stress
on eyewitness memory); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the
Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 699–704 (2004)
(discussing findings that “high levels of stress negatively impact both accuracy of eyewitness
identification as well as accuracy of recall of crime-related details”); see also Gary L. Wells
& Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 279 (2003)
(discussing studies on the effects of cross-race identification and lighting conditions). See
generally BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY (1979); Wells & Seelau, supra note 64.
84
See What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 50–51 (discussing reform proposals for
lineup foil selection designed to prevent the suspect from standing out); see also infra notes
141–42. Multiple showings of the same suspect to the same witness may contribute to an
erroneous identification due to a psychological phenomenon known as “unconscious
transference.” See LOFTUS, supra note 83, at 142–44; LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 83, at 106–
08; see also Gabriel W. Gorenstein & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Effect of Choosing an Incorrect
Photograph on a Later Identification by an Eyewitness, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 616, 621
(1980) (describing a study confirming that once an eyewitness selects an incorrect face, he or
she is likely to make the same incorrect selection at a later time); Frontline: What Jennifer
Saw, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/interviews/thompson.html
(last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (providing a transcript of an interview with rape victim Jennifer
Thompson who reports that even after DNA proved that Bobby Poole was the actual rapist,
in her mind she continued to see the face of the man she had wrongly accused, Ronald
Cotton).
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has the effect of bolstering the witness’s confidence in the erroneous
selection.85
Police determination to build a case with witness testimony can go far
beyond merely suggestive procedures and can closely resemble the type of
determined coercion, and even deception, employed against suspects during
interrogation. In more egregious cases, police officers can use outright
threats, intimidation, and persistence to pressure a witness to identify a
person the police seek to prosecute.
A major investigation by the Houston Chronicle uncovered evidence
of witness intimidation that had provided the only evidence supporting the
capital murder conviction of Ruben Cantu in 1985.86 Cantu was a teenager
with no criminal record at the time of the murder, which was witnessed
only by Juan Moreno, a teenager and undocumented immigrant who was
himself severely injured. Cantu became the leading suspect in the murder
after his involvement in a later incident resulting in the non-fatal shooting
of an off-duty police officer. The police tried twice with no success to
obtain a positive identification of Cantu from Moreno by showing him
photo arrays that included Cantu.87 The day after the second attempt, the
police took the deportable teenage witness to the police station to view a
third photo array containing Cantu’s photo.88 This time Moreno identified
Cantu. Years later, according to the newspaper:
Moreno said he felt compelled to do what the officers wanted, even though he knew it
was wrong. “The police were sure it was [Cantu] because he had hurt a police
officer,” Moreno said in a recent interview. “They told me they were certain it was
89
him, and that’s why I testified. That was bad to blame someone that was not there.”

Ruben Cantu never stopped proclaiming his innocence. He was executed in
1993. The prosecutor regrets seeking the death penalty in a case in which
the sole eyewitness was able to identify the defendant only after being
shown the same person’s photo three times.90 In retrospect, he now states:
85

See Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A
Meta-Analysis of the Post-Identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
859, 860 (2006); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”:
Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 374 (1998); John S. Shaw, III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated
Postevent Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 629, 630–31, 649–50 (1996).
86
Lise Olsen, Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man? The Cantu Case: Death and Doubt;
Eyewitness Says He Felt Influenced by Police To Identify the Teen as the Killer, HOUS.
CHRON., Nov. 20, 2005, at A1.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
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“We have a system that permits people to be convicted based on evidence
that could be wrong because it’s mistaken or because it’s corrupt.”91
In the case of Ricardo Aldape Guerra, both police and prosecutors
coerced eyewitnesses in order to obtain identification evidence leading to a
capital murder conviction.92 Like Cantu’s case, this case involved the
shooting of a police officer, but here the shooting was fatal.93 Years after
the conviction, witnesses—who were all innocent bystanders—testified that
police officers used angry, vulgar language in rejecting their statements
identifying a different man, not Guerra, as the shooter.94 One witness was
told that the police would take her infant daughter away from her unless she
cooperated.95 She also watched as police officers yelled at her aunt,
handcuffed her, and put her in a police car.96 Another witness was
threatened with her arrest and that of her husband if she did not cooperate. 97
Over twelve years after the conviction, a federal court granted Guerra’s
petition for the writ of habeas corpus and denounced in the strongest terms
the extreme police and prosecutorial misconduct, which also went beyond
witness intimidation.98
We have no way of knowing how often the police intimidate witnesses
into identifying the person the police want them to choose, but the cases of
Cantu and Guerra demonstrate that it does happen. Brandon Garrett’s
research of DNA exonerations shows several instances in which
eyewitnesses reported feeling pressured to identify a particular person.99
Many of the tactics used with eyewitnesses resemble those used in
interrogations, such as the use of lengthy detentions as a means of
91

Id.
Guerra v. Collins, 916 F. Supp. 620, 637 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Guerra v.
Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
93
Id. at 623.
94
Id. at 624–25.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 625.
98
Id. at 637 (“The police officers’ and the prosecutors’ actions described in these
findings were intentional, were done in bad faith, and are outrageous. These men and
women, sworn to uphold the law, abandoned their charge and became merchants of chaos.”);
see also People v. Lee, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing conviction
in part because police coerced eyewitness into identifying defendant by improper threat to
try eyewitness for murder unless he named defendant as the killer).
99
See GARRETT, Characteristics of Eyewitness Misidentifications in DNA Exonerees’
Trials, in CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG, supra
note 70, ch. 3, app., available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/
convicting_the_innocent/garrett_eyewitness_appendix.pdf. (cases include Habib Abdal,
Ulyssess Rodriguez Charles, Thomas Doswell, Jerry Lee Evans, and Michael Evans, among
others).
92
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pressuring them to “name names.”100 Other times, witnesses are given
information (which may or may not be truthful) about certain suspects that
matches their descriptions of the individuals. This information signals to
the witness the officer’s belief in that particular person’s guilt.101
Sometimes the suggestion is so blatant as to make the identification process
a farce. In one case the witness was shown the photo of the suspect first
and then shown a photo array that also included his photo—the equivalent
of telling a student the answer to a multiple choice question before
administering the exam question.102 If witnesses initially pick a filler
instead of the suspect, they may be told to try again—clearly
communicating that the first choice was “wrong” and they should pick one
of the others.103
Like informants, witnesses may even make an
identification in exchange for some type of reward.104 In another extreme
case, a federal appeals court found that the police officer had “fabricated” a
lineup by making the defendant’s photo obviously stand out in a photo
array in order to frame the defendant for failing to cooperate.105
As with suspects and potential informants, the psychological
vulnerabilities of eyewitnesses being questioned by the police play an
important role. In the Guerra case, the witness was held overnight at the
police station. The petitioner argued that “in addition to lack of sleep, the
ability to coerce and intimidate the witnesses was made easy by three other
factors common to most of the key witnesses, i.e., their inability to speak

100

Id. (Michael Evans case: witness detained for ten hours and pressured to name
names).
101
Id. (Jerry Lee Evans case: victim initially described attacker as having a black glove
with metal-looking spikes, and police told witness after identification that Evans had
previously been arrested for wearing spiked knuckles; Larry Fuller case: witness told that the
photo was taken the morning of identification at Fuller’s house and that he had previously
been imprisoned for armed robbery; Anthony Green case: witness told suspect’s name was
Tony and she had indicated that assailant had identified himself as Tony).
102
Id. (Clarence Harrison case). In the Jerry Lee Evans case, the D.A.’s office later
described the police as “leading and encouraging” the victim to pick Evans. Id. (Jerry Lee
Evans case). The victim in another case was shown only one photo and then told that the
police would likely dismiss the case if she did not identify him. Id. (Peter Rose case).
Another was told that if she did not identify the suspect in a single-person show-up, he
would be released, making the investigation more complex because he would be harder to
locate. Id. (Eduardo Velasquez case).
103
Id. (Joe Jones case: filler chosen twice and then wrongly convicted; Larry Mayes
case: suspect chosen on second attempt).
104
Id. (Paula Gray case: witness initially did not make an identification, but made the
identification after police offered assistance and relocation; Willie Rainge case: victim
initially did not identify suspect, and only did so after offered police relocation).
105
Id. (Donald Wayne Good case); see also Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir.
2010).
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fluent English, their lack of education, and their youth.”106 The court in
Guerra acknowledged the special vulnerability of juveniles to intimidating
police tactics.107 Cantu’s case also involved the intimidation of a juvenile,
who was also subject to deportation.108
As the research in the area of false confessions shows, juveniles and
those with an intellectual disability or mental illness have a greater
likelihood of succumbing to police intimidation.109 In addition, the research
on eyewitness identifications shows that these groups are also less likely to
be reliable eyewitnesses. Children and the elderly,110 mentally disabled
persons, and persons on certain medications, intoxicants, or controlled
substances111 are less likely to provide accurate identification evidence.
Their sensory disadvantage exists regardless of the methods employed by
investigators.112 If suggestive or coercive tactics are used, the likelihood of
misidentification is necessarily compounded.
In addition, researchers have observed that being the victim of a
violent crime can cause a witness to experience an intense fear that can
cause lasting psychological damage. Witnesses “often report having been
really frightened, sometimes admitting that they do not remember much
detail about what occurred in the frightening situation, even on rare
occasion admitting to symptoms persisting for weeks, at least, symptoms
resembling those characteristic of posttraumatic stress disorder” (PTSD).113
The research shows that evidence of such symptoms suggests an increased
possibility of “catastrophic decline in memory performance.”114 Thus,
106

Guerra v. Collins, 916 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Guerra v.
Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
107
Id. at 627. DNA exonerations also show that the use of leading questions can lead
young victims to identify a suspect wrongly. See GARRETT, supra note 99 (Leonard
McSherry case: seven-year-old victim’s actual description of culprit was ignored, and police
used leading questions to “help her go along with what [they] were trying to emphasize”).
108
See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
109
See supra notes 74–75.
110
See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1502–03 (reporting that “very
young children and the elderly perform [] significantly worse than younger adults” in studies
of eyewitness identification (quoting Wells & Olson, supra note 83, at 280)).
111
It is obvious that a person’s physical and mental condition is affected by intoxicants
and some medications such as painkillers. Courts nonetheless have allowed witnesses who
observed assailants under these conditions to give eyewitness testimony. See Sandra Guerra
Thompson, Judicial Blindness to Eyewitness Misidentification, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 639, 653
(2009) [hereinafter Judicial Blindness].
112
Scientists refer to such factors as “estimator variables” because these variables relate
solely to the innate qualities of a witness’s observation and cannot be improved through
systemic change. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 64, at 765–66.
113
See Deffenbacher et al., supra note 83, at 822.
114
Id.
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research indicates that the trauma of a violent crime may cause witnesses to
develop psychological problems such as PTSD, a symptom of which is loss
of memory. Psychological disorders such as PTSD might also make a
witness more vulnerable to suggestive or coercive practices; this would be a
useful area of research for social scientists to pursue.115
In short, all three types of testimonial evidence studied here derive
from interactions of the police with individuals who may have information
to offer. In each instance, the individuals tend to be at a significant
psychological disadvantage due to the circumstances in which they find
themselves and possibly also due to certain other factors that make them
less reliable sources of information. The police believe they know the
identity of the criminal, so their goal during the questioning of these
individuals is to obtain confirmation, not neutral truth-seeking. To facilitate
the information gathering, the police may use methods that are highly
suggestive, coercive, or deceptive. These tactics have been shown to create
a substantial risk of producing false information, leading to wrongful
convictions.
Moreover, the processes involved in gathering police-generated
witness testimony have traditionally remained beyond public scrutiny.
Researchers have outlined a number of advantages that accrue to law
enforcement by maintaining the secrecy of individual custodial
interrogations and negotiations with informants.116 The incentives for law
enforcement run squarely against thorough documentation requirements:
documentation invites criticism, judicial oversight, and possible legal
repercussions for intentional or unintentional legal violations. Interference
in the processes that produce admissible prosecution evidence may be seen
as a hindrance to effective law enforcement, and therefore something to be
avoided.117
115
Garrett’s research shows that victims often report feeling nervous or scared during
identification procedures, sometimes hastily selecting someone in order to get out of the
room quickly. GARRETT, supra note 99 (Ulysses Rodriguez Charles case: victim picked a
filler and then was told to keep looking, so she picked another photo and ran out of the room;
Luis Diaz case: victim initially identified another man in the lineup because she “wanted to
get out of the room”; Jeffrey Todd Pierce case: victim was unable to identify Pierce at a
show-up following the offense because she reported being “hysterical and . . . still in a state
of shock”; Brian Piszczek case: victim reported that six weeks after the crime, she was “still
hysterical” but claimed that her memory had improved over time).
116
NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 83–99; see LEO, supra note 10, at 83–84 (discussing the
perceived need for secrecy in the context of behavioral lie-detection methods).
117
See JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 224–29 (1996) (describing the protective
culture within police departments which leads to constant attempts to circumvent mandates
imposed from outside the organization); Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the
Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 848 (1999)
(“[E]xternal controls and accountability mechanisms (desirable as they are) cannot be
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Custodial interrogations in most jurisdictions are not routinely
recorded, so the process cannot be fully evaluated to determine whether the
officers may have contaminated the process by suggesting details of the
crime to the suspect or whether there were coercive means used to obtain
the statements.118 Thus, besides the DNA exoneration cases that involve
false confessions, it is impossible to know how many more false
confessions may have led to wrongful convictions.119 The unavailability of
DNA in those cases means that the injustice may never be discovered.
Eyewitness identification procedures typically generate insufficient
documentation. It may be common to preserve a photograph of a lineup or
the photo array used in a case, but interviews with eyewitnesses have
generally not been well documented and certainly have not been
electronically recorded. Some jurisdictions have made great strides in this
area, but most have not.120
With police informants, even prosecutors may not know much about
the informant’s history as a prosecution witness in a past case or the
rewards given for the informant’s previous testimony. Police officers are
normally reluctant to share information about their informants with
prosecutors because they may not trust prosecutors to manage their
informants properly.121 Natapoff reports that New York and Chicago police
went so far as to maintain “double file” systems for investigative reports:
one set was shared with the public and prosecutors, and one set was kept
secret.122 For constitutional purposes, prosecutors are required to make
pretrial disclosures about the witness’s history as an informant that tends to
impeach the credibility of the witness, such as the informant’s criminal
record, prior testimony as an informant, rewards promised, etc.123
However, there is no corresponding affirmative duty for prosecutors to
obtain the information from the police, nor do they have the incentives to
seek out such impeachment material on their witnesses.124 Thus, for all
intents and purposes, all three types of evidence—confessions, informant
statements, and eyewitness identifications—have been understood only

expected to be effective unless police organizations are themselves involved in the process
of control.” (quoting DAVID DIXON, LAW IN POLICING: LEGAL REGULATION AND POLICE
PRACTICES 94–95 (1997))).
118
Garrett, supra note 73, at 1110.
119
Id.
120
See What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 42–43.
121
See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 23.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 58–60.
124
Id. at 74–75 (discussing Los Angeles scandal that revealed that prosecutors
intentionally did not track informants’ histories and rewards).
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through the oral testimony of participants in the questioning: the police
officers (relating confessions), informants, and eyewitnesses.
B. BEST PRACTICES

As the number of DNA exonerations reaches 300,125 the calls for
reform to address the causes of wrongful convictions continue to ring out
from various quarters. Legal reform groups such as the Innocence Project
and the (now-defunct) Justice Project have published reports outlining best
practices,126 as have the American Bar Association127 and social science
scholars.128
Among the law scholars who specialize in wrongful
convictions,129 most focus on a particular cause of wrongful convictions
125
As of this writing, the Innocence Project of the Cardozo School of Law reports that
DNA evidence has led to the exoneration of 300 individuals. Know the Cases, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited October 10, 2012).
126
Understand the Causes: The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012); THE JUSTICE
PROJECT, THE SOLUTION: AGENDA FOR REFORM (on file with author). On eyewitness
identification, see Model Legislation, 2009 State Legislative Sessions: An Act to Improve the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 2008),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/09_model_legislation/Eyewitness_ID_
Prescriptive_Model_Bill_2009.pdf; THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A
POLICY REVIEW (2007), available at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~glwells/
The_Justice%20Project_Eyewitness_Identification_%20A_Policy_Review.pdf (last visited
Feb. 13, 2012). On custodial interrogations, see Model Legislation, 2010 Legislative
Sessions: An Act Directing the Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, INNOCENCE
PROJECT (Dec. 2009), http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/2010/Recording_of_Custodial
_Interrogations_Model_Bill_2010.pdf; THE JUSTICE PROJECT, ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW (2007) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC
RECORDING] (on file with author). On police informants, see THE JUSTICE PROJECT, INCUSTODY INFORMANT TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW (2007) [hereinafter INFORMANT
REPORT] (on file with author).
127
See AM. BAR ASS’N (ABA), ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING
THE GUILTY: REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE
COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (Paul C. Giannelli &
Myrna S. Raeder eds., 2006), reprinted in 37 SW. U. L. REV. 763 (2008) [hereinafter ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION] (addressing all the types of evidence examined here, among
others).
128
See supra notes 10 & 45 and infra notes 158 & 163.
129
The literature on wrongful convictions issues other than confessions, the use of police
informants, and eyewitness identifications covers a wide area of other causes and concerns.
A few examples include: Garrett, supra note 30 (providing an empirical study of case law of
exonerees, and finding that appellate review is ineffective in reviewing inaccurate evidence);
Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1123 (2005) (addressing impediments to gathering and introducing evidence);
Richard A. Leo & John B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning from Social
Science, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7 (2009) (arguing that legal scholars should use social
science to address wrongful convictions, not simply narrative or doctrine).
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such as eyewitness identification,130 custodial interrogations,131 or police
informants.132 Law enforcement officials have produced some reports,133

130

This author and a few others addressed the admissibility of identification testimony
relating solely to reliability and urged procedural reforms. See, e.g., Noah Clements,
Flipping a Coin: A Solution for the Inherent Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification
Testimony, 40 IND. L. REV. 271 (2007) (proposing blanket exclusion of eyewitness
identification testimony in criminal cases due to unreliability); Margery Malkin Koosed, The
Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won’t—Unless It Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness
Identifications, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 263 (2002) (calling for legislative measures to assure greater
reliability of eyewitness identification testimony in capital cases); Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt?, supra note 10 (recommending a corroboration requirement for admission of
eyewitness identification evidence); Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 631–33
(urging state courts to apply state constitutional law or evidentiary rules to guard against
admission of unreliable identification testimony); What Price Justice?, supra note 59
(reviewing reform proposals for eyewitness identification procedures); Richard A. Wise,
Kirsten A. Dauphinais & Martin A. Safer, A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807 (2007) (advocating expanded use of expert testimony,
improved procedural safeguards, and judicial education).
131
Richard Leo, together with various co-authors, has done extensive empirical legal
work on custodial interrogations and the reforms needed to improve reliability. See Mark
Costanzo & Richard A. Leo, Research and Expert Testimony on Interrogation and
Confessions, in EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS 69 (Mark Costanzo,
Daniel Krauss & Kathy Pezdek eds., 2006); Deborah Davis & Richard Leo, Strategies for
Preventing False Confessions and Their Consequences, in PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR
FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 121 (Mark R. Kebbell & Graham M. Davies
eds., 2006); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479 [hereinafter Bringing
Reliability Back In]; LEO, supra note 10, at 288–317; see also Garrett, supra note 73;
Eugene R. Milhizer, Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding
Unreliable Confessions, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2008). Most other scholars writing in the area
of custodial interrogations have focused exclusively on the constitutional issues such as the
applicability of Miranda, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and voluntariness under the
Due Process Clause. For a small sample of the rich constitutional literature, see Morgan
Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded
Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495 (2002) (addressing constitutional doctrine pertaining to
interrogations of the mentally retarded); Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False
Confessions Discovered, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 623 (2007) (critiquing Supreme Court’s
subversion of reliability factor in recent constitutional confession law); George C. Thomas
III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1091, 1103 (2003) (reviewing WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS (2001)).
132
Alexandra Natapoff has written extensively on the subject. See NATAPOFF, supra note
2; Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful
Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107 (2006). Other scholars have made important
contributions to the issue as well. See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and
Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2000); Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil:
Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse
Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413 (2007); Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishments,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999).

356

SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON

[Vol. 102

and most legislatures have taken some type of action, whether to form a
study group or to enact new legislation.134 Some state and federal courts
have also recognized the danger of wrongful conviction posed by the types
of evidence studied here, but only a few have created rules to minimize the
risk.135 For example, more than ten years after the Department of Justice
issued a comprehensive set of guidelines for reforms of police procedures
for eyewitness identification, only a few jurisdictions have mandated any of
those procedures.136 Moreover, even jurisdictions that have enacted new
procedures for identification evidence have not gone so far as to mandate
exclusion of the evidence for failure to follow the procedures.137 Thus, we
have seen some significant improvement in the quality of identification
evidence in a few states and localities, but little to no improvement in most
jurisdictions.138 Reforms of both custodial interrogation and the use of
police informants have lagged even more than reform of eyewitness

133
The most comprehensive and influential reports by law enforcement pertain to
eyewitness identifications. They include: NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf; N.C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE COMM’N,
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ncids.org/New Legal Resources/Eyewitness ID.pdf; OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN.,
STATE OF N.J., ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO
AND
LIVE
LINEUP
IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES
(2001),
available
at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf. For a discussion of reform proposals on
eyewitness identifications, see What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 40–55.
134
See Reforms by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
news/LawView3.php (providing links to state legislation on eyewitness identification
reforms); Reforms by State: State Laws Requiring Recorded Interrogations, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/LawView3.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2012)
(providing links to state legislation on electronic recording of interrogations); INFORMANT
REPORT, supra note 126, at 4–5, 14 (addressing legislative actions regarding the use of
informant testimony).
135
See INFORMANT REPORT, supra note 126, at 6–7 (outlining the federal and state case
law recognizing safeguards in the use of informant testimony).
136
See, e.g., Reforms by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
news/LawView5.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2012) (showing only eleven states with state-wide
eyewitness identification reforms).
137
Thus, courts can and do continue to admit identification evidence, even though it is
shown to be produced by means known to decrease the reliability of the evidence and despite
the fact that there are known means for reducing the degree of unreliability that law
enforcement officials have simply chosen not to adopt. See Judicial Blindness, supra note
111, at 657–58.
138
I have previously cataloged the few jurisprudential innovations of state courts, see
Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 621–30, as well as the few states that have
adopted reform procedures as a matter of law or by voluntary adoption, see What Price
Justice?, supra note 59, at 42–55.
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identification.139 Overall, it is fair to say that actual reform of police
practices in these three areas has proved sporadic, and there is much room
for improvement in the practices actually used to collect these three types of
evidence.
Interestingly, the procedures recommended for all three types of
evidence have certain elements in common. On further reflection, the
similarities in the best practices proposed by reformers (and observed in
some jurisdictions) should not surprise us. Since so many of the
weaknesses of all three types of evidence derive from the interactions of
vulnerable individuals and determined investigators, as shown above, it
stands to reason that the practices most likely to improve reliability would
share similar traits.
First, for all three types of police-generated witness testimony
considered here, best practices include procedures that protect against
“contamination” by providing details of the crime to the individual being
questioned or using suggestive tactics.140 Especially for lineups and photo
arrays, and to a lesser extent for interrogations, it is considered good
practice to use a “blind” questioner (an officer who does not have
information about the crime or the suspect).141
For eyewitness
identifications, it is recommended practice that the person administering the
identification procedure also gives cautionary instructions to the witness so
that the witness does not try to discern clues from the investigator and so
that the witness does not feel any pressure to make a selection. Blind
administration of identification procedures also eliminates the problem that
occurs when officers give confirmatory feedback to the witness (such as,

139
For interrogations, the primary reform measure has been electronic recording, but in
only a few jurisdictions have we seen any meaningful efforts to curb the coercive or
suggestive practices used by law enforcement through legislative or judicial means. See
infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. In the area of police informants, Natapoff
reports that jurisdictions have enacted only a few legislative safeguards. See NATAPOFF,
supra note 2, at 192–200.
140
Leo invokes the concept of contamination in discussing the ways in which
interrogators may feed nonpublic details of crimes to suspects in helping the suspects to
construct the public narrative that will explain how and why the crime was committed. See
LEO, supra note 10, at 234–35, 286–87.
141
Using a “blind” administrator for a study is a device commonly used to maintain the
integrity of social science research studies. See Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens
Steblay & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin
County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 381,
389–90 (2006). It is a feature of the leading reform proposals for eyewitness identifications.
See What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 43–44.

358

SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON

[Vol. 102

“You picked the right person”), which has the effect of increasing a
witness’s level of confidence in the selection made.142
For custodial interrogation, the Supreme Court already mandates
cautionary instructions to the arrestee prior to the questioning.143 The
Miranda warnings ostensibly serve the purpose of putting the arrestee on
stronger footing vis-à-vis the questioner so as to reduce the possibility of
coercion, thus protecting a vulnerable individual from possible coercion by
a determined interrogator. Moreover, to avoid contamination of the
process, Leo and Ofshe would have courts review confessions for evidence
that the information actually originates from the suspect and is not the
product of contamination by the police. 144 According to a study of thirtyeight exonerations by Garrett, “[i]n all cases but two (ninety-seven
percent—or thirty-six of the thirty-eight—of the exonerees for whom trial
or pretrial records could be obtained), police reported that suspects
confessed to a series of specific details concerning how the crime
occurred.”145 This leads him to conclude that “police likely disclosed those
details during interrogations by telling [the suspects] how the crime
happened.”146 As a guard against such contamination, Garrett proposes the
use of an investigator who is not involved in the investigation and is not

142
See Wells & Bradfield, supra note 85, at 364 (finding feedback given to witnesses
after identifying suspect produces strong effects on witnesses’ retrospective reports of their
certainty, quality of the view they had, clarity of their memory, speed with which they
identified the suspect, and several other measures).
143
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
144
LEO, supra note 10, at 286–87. Rather than considering the circumstances under
which a confession is obtained, the courts instead compare the facts of the crime known only
to the police to the statements made by the individual, looking for the “degree of fit.” Id. at
286. This approach calls on the judge to assess three factors that indicate the individual’s
personal knowledge: whether the confession provided information that “leads to the
discovery of evidence unknown to the police,” (2) whether it provided information about
“highly unusual elements of the crime that have not been made public,” and (3) whether it
provided “an accurate description of the mundane details of the crime scene which are not
easily guessed and have not been reported publicly.” Id. (quoting State v. Mauchley, 467
P.3d 477, 489 (Utah 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of considering
the mundane details of the crime scene, for example, is that those are “less likely to be the
result of suggestion by the police.” Id. Videotaping is especially important because at least
one study by Brandon Garrett shows that false confessions frequently contain “surprisingly
rich, detailed, and accurate information” about the crime, precisely the kind of information
that is considered evidence of the reliability of the confession. See Garrett, supra note 73, at
1054.
145
Garrett, supra note 73, at 1054.
146
Id.
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privy to the details of the crime. 147 In effect, he proposes that the police use
a “blind” interrogator. 148
Second, proper documentation, preferably through videotaping, is
recommended for all three types of evidence. The lack of information
about each of these three types of investigative activities has posed a
challenge to courts and reformers who seek to impose some form of
regulation.149
Indeed, secrecy shrouds the practice of custodial
interrogation and the use of police informants,150 and identification
practices have remained outside of view by virtue of the lack of
documentation.151

147

Id. at 1116.
Id. This proposal would encounter resistance from police officers who likely consider
it essential for an interrogator to know what information to seek and what inconsistencies to
confront a suspect with. I do not here propose the use of blind interrogators, but since it
would clearly eliminate the problem of contamination it is worthy of further exploration.
149
For courts and researchers studying custodial interrogations, police training manuals
have provided a wealth of information about the psychological tactics used to obtain
incriminating statements from suspects. See LEO, supra note 10, at 106–16 (addressing
techniques of psychological manipulation explained in police training manuals). More
recently, researchers have conducted field studies that provide some information about
confessions and eyewitness identifications. See, e.g., Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L.
Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 475 (2001) (on studies of actual identification practices); Richard J. Ofshe &
Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and
Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 189–251 (1997) (on
interrogations). To gather information about police informants, Natapoff conducted
interviews of informants and detectives; researched statutes, case law and news reports; and
studied other writings on the subject, including reform proposals. See generally NATAPOFF,
supra note 2.
150
See LEO, supra note 10, at 35–36 (discussing the secretiveness of interrogations);
NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 83–99 (discussing the secretiveness of informant practices).
151
One may view the Supreme Court’s recognition of a right to counsel at lineups as an
attempt to provide a prophylactic remedy for possible police suggestion. See United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–38 (1967); see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272
(1967). The presence of counsel can better ensure that non-suggestive practices are
followed. However, the presence of counsel serves as a poor substitute for proper
documentation because it puts counsel in the position of becoming a witness and being
disqualified to continue as counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Peng, 602 F. Supp. 298, 300–
03 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (disqualifying defense counsel as attorney under Model Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 5-102(a) because counsel participated in a conference
between defendant and a witness, thus becoming witness himself). Of course, the Court’s
later opinions so greatly limited the scope of the right to counsel as to virtually nullify it.
See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1510–11 (addressing the effects of
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972), and United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321
(1973), which apply right to counsel only to post-indictment lineups and live lineups,
respectively). Thus, the right to counsel has not served effectively either as a prophylactic
remedy or as a substitute for a documentation requirement.
148
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The leading reform on interrogations is the videotaping of the entirety
of the interrogation, which is considered “imperative . . . so that it is
possible to discern whether the facts were suggested to the [suspects] prior
to the subsequent recording of a confession.”152 Videotaping of the entirety
of the interrogation allows the court to evaluate whether any improper
suggestion occurred and thus avoid resorting to the inevitable “swearing
match” between the police and the defendant.153 Although a number of
states have adopted videotaping and the trend is strengthening, a majority of
law enforcement agencies still do not videotape interrogations.154
Reformers propose adequate documentation and disclosure of evidence
relating to eyewitness identifications and informant testimony as well.155 At
a minimum, for eyewitness identifications, the police should preserve the
photo arrays used or create a photographic image of the live lineup so that
they become part of the record.156 Ideally, the interaction between an
eyewitness and a police investigator during the administration of an
identification procedure would be documented by means of videotaping, in
addition to preserving the lineup or photo array.157 With regard to
informant testimony, the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern
152

Garrett, supra note 73, at 1059; see generally LEO, supra note 10, at 291–305
(regarding the movement for electronic recording of interrogations). The ABA Criminal
Justice Section urges law enforcement agencies to videotape the entirety of custodial
interrogations, and further urges courts or legislatures, or both, to enact rules of procedure
requiring such videotaping. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 127, at 11–22.
The Justice Project made the same recommendation for felony cases. See ELECTRONIC
RECORDING, supra note 126, at 2–4.
153
Additionally, videotaping would actually “save substantial court time and expense
because electronically recorded confessions would induce guilty pleas from individuals who
would otherwise take their cases to trial.” Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In, supra
note 131, 524 n.301. It would also “cut down on the time spent testifying by police and
defendants at pretrial hearings (such as voluntariness hearings) about what occurred during
the interrogation because the electronic recording objectively resolves that issue.” Id.
154
See ELECTRONIC RECORDING, supra note 126, at 2 (“In 2004–2005, state legislators in
twenty-five states introduced legislation seeking to mandate the recording of custodial
interrogations.”); LEO, supra note 10, at 296 (noting that most police departments do not
record interrogations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation refuses to record as a matter of
policy).
155
See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 192–94 (discovery and disclosure of information
about informants); What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 48–49 (documentation of
identification procedures).
156
See What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 48 & nn.137–38 (stating that New Jersey
and North Carolina require photographic or video documentation, while the Innocence
Project proposes only photographic documentation).
157
See id. at 48–49 (stating that the Department of Justice encourages, but does not
require, audio or video recording, and the ABA Criminal Justice Section requires video
recording “whenever practicable” or photographic documentation if video recording is not
possible).

2012]

POLICE-GENERATED TESTIMONY

361

University School of Law recommends that informants be wired to
electronically record any incriminating statements made by suspects.158
The group also recommends that law enforcement authorities electronically
record their discussions with potential informants.159 The photographs of
lineups and electronic recordings of the administration of identification
procedures, as well as those recordings and other information pertaining to
informants, should all be disclosed to the defense before trial.160
In addition, for eyewitness identifications, the best practices call for
soliciting and documenting an eyewitness’s confidence level after a positive
identification so as to document the degree of confidence at that time.161
This has been found to be important because the witness will typically
receive confirmatory feedback from the investigating officer or the
prosecutor who will meet with the witness during the pretrial stage of the
proceedings.162 Indeed, the very process of pretrial preparation has been
found to increase a witness’s confidence in the identification such that the
confidence exhibited at trial exceeds that which the witness reports
initially.163 A confidence statement made at the time of the identification is
critical to properly evaluate the likely accuracy of an identification.
Third, there is a growing recognition of the importance of jury
instructions and expert witnesses to help jurors better appreciate the ways in
which these types of evidence may be rendered less reliable.164 These
remedies assume the traditional treatment of these three types of evidence,
which is that the court will not conduct pretrial reliability screening and that
158

CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 15.
Id.
160
See id. (proposing disclosure requirements relating to informant testimony);
INFORMANT REPORT, supra note 126, at 3 (recommending mandatory, automatic pretrial
disclosures relating to in-custody informants); NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 192–94 (making
the same recommendations as the Justice Project but for all police informants, not limited to
in-custody informants).
161
See What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 52; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2933.83(A)(6)(h)–(i) (West 2011) (requiring the administrator of a photo or live lineup to
obtain a statement of the witness’s confidence, stated in the eyewitness’s own words, as to
the certainty of the eyewitness’s identification and prohibiting any confirmatory feedback to
the witness until the administrator has documented the results of the procedure).
162
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
163
See Shaw & McClure, supra note 85, at 630–31, 649–50 (stating that the adjudicative
process and witness preparation for trial can artificially increase a witness’s stated
confidence level).
164
The ABA Criminal Justice Section’s proposals address all three types of evidence.
The report addresses the discretion exercised by courts to allow testimony by experts on
eyewitness identification and to give cautionary jury instructions on identifications and
jailhouse informants. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 127, at 24
(admission of expert testimony and use of jury instructions on eyewitness identification); id.
at 77 (practices regarding jury instructions on jailhouse informants).
159
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the jury alone will weigh its reliability. For example, the Justice Project
recommended the use of jury instructions warning jurors about the special
unreliability of jailhouse informants.165
The use of jury instructions and expert witnesses has grown
substantially in the area of eyewitness identification, reversing the
traditional rejection of these devices.166 With regard to the social science of
interrogations, Leo reports that the use of expert testimony has also become
increasingly common.167 He also notes that the use of jury instructions
regarding interrogations remains “rare,” but such a reform offers several
important advantages.168 No court has ever admitted expert testimony by a
defendant on the unreliability of police informants, “although comparable
government witnesses (e.g., police handlers, gang experts, etc.) have been
permitted to testify about how informants operate.”169
In any case, studies have shown that jurors are psychologically
predisposed to believe eyewitness identification testimony and evidence of
confessions,170 so these remedies would have to overcome that
psychological predisposition. Nor does the use of jury instructions hold
much hope as an effective remedy in cases involving police informants.
Natapoff argues that social science casts doubt on the ability of jurors to
understand and properly apply jury instructions.171 Another study also
indicates that jurors are no less likely to believe a witness, even if they learn
that the witness has received a reward or incentive for the testimony.172
Finally, there are calls to require corroborating evidence in
determining the admissibility of these three types of evidence. Police
informant testimony (including that given by alleged accomplices) presents
such a risk of unreliability that some states have already adopted a
requirement that it be corroborated by other evidence.173 In addition,
165

INFORMANT REPORT, supra note 126, at 2.
See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 628–30.
167
See LEO, supra note 10, at 314–16.
168
Id. at 316–17.
169
Correspondence from Alexandra Natapoff, Aug. 2, 2011 (on file with author).
170
See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 83, at 207–09 (summarizing survey studies,
prediction studies, and mock juror studies, and concluding that “jurors are generally
insensitive to factors that influence eyewitness identification accuracy”); LEO, supra note 10,
at 265 (explaining that jurors are subject to tunnel vision and confirmation bias, especially
after learning that the defendant has written or signed a confession statement).
171
See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 197–99 (taking issue with the Justice Project proposal
based on psychological studies of juror behavior).
172
Id. at 77.
173
See id. at 196–97 (discussing reforms in Texas and at the federal level); see also TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.075 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (requiring that the testimony
of a person confined in same correctional facility as the defendant be corroborated by
166
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groups like the ABA and the Justice Project have urged this restriction on
the use of informant testimony.174
I have previously called for a corroboration requirement for eyewitness
identification testimony as a means of better ensuring reliability.175 To date,
only a 2009 Maryland law requires evidence corroborating the testimony of
eyewitnesses, and the restriction applies solely in capital cases.176 In every
other American jurisdiction, a single eyewitness’s testimony identifying a
stranger as the guilty perpetrator can convict a person of a serious crime,
including capital murder.
Leo puts forth what amounts to a new corroboration requirement for
confessions. He has proposed a “new reliability test,” which involves
determining the “fit” between the details provided by the suspect and the
known crime facts and other objective evidence.177 He would require courts
to weigh three factors similar to those in the previous trustworthiness test he
outlined with Ofshe. Under his new test, courts should weigh:
(1) whether the confession contains nonpublic information that can be independently
verified, would be known only by the true perpetrator or an accomplice, and cannot
likely be guessed by chance; (2) whether the confession led the police to new
evidence about the crime; and (3) whether the suspect’s postadmission narrative fits
178
the crime facts and other objective evidence.

Although no jurisdiction has yet adopted a corroboration requirement for
confessions evidence, a number of courts have applied a “trustworthiness”
test, similar to one previously proposed by Ofshe and Leo, which also took

evidence connecting the defendant with the offense); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111.5 (West
Supp. 2011) (same; also disallowing corroboration to come from another in-custody
informant).
174
See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 197.
175
See Judicial Blindness, supra note 111, at 1523–43.
176
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. L. § 2-202(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). See also Margery
Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Protect the
Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 633–39 (2009) (addressing the Maryland identification
law, as well as efforts to adopt similar corroboration requirements in Illinois, Massachusetts,
and Britain).
177
LEO, supra note 10, at 288–89. Leo notes that courts have long applied a
corroboration rule (the corpus delicti rule) to out-of-court confessions. Id. at 284–85. He
explains that the corpus delicti rule is not a useful tool for assuring reliability, however,
because it requires corroborating evidence of the crime itself—not evidence to corroborate
the confession. Id. at 284. The rule addresses a valid concern that in some cases individuals
will confess falsely to murders that did not occur; thus, it requires corroborating evidence
that a harm or injury actually befell the victim. The rule focuses only on proof of the crime,
not the reliability of the confession, so we cannot assume that proof of the former also
proves the latter. As Leo writes, “this has been disproved by countless false confessions to
very real crimes.” Id.
178
Id. at 289.
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into account the existence of corroborating evidence.179 Thus, there is
reason to think that some courts might continue to examine corroborating
evidence in determining the admissibility of confessions.
Ideally, police departments across the country would adopt all the best
practices in procuring confessions, informant testimony, and eyewitness
identifications.180 Although the use of proper police procedures cannot
eliminate the risk that a police-generated statement is still false, the
adoption of best practices would reduce the element of unreliability
introduced by suggestive or coercive police practices.
Proper
documentation and discovery would allow the courts to conduct a more
accurate reliability assessment.
III. PRETRIAL RELIABILITY HEARINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES
In addition to best practices for the police, researchers have
recommended that courts conduct pretrial reliability hearings for policegenerated testimonial evidence.181 The recommendations for pretrial
reliability screening call into question the traditional practices of trial courts
in admitting possibly unreliable prosecution evidence and would require a
new approach to admitting these three common forms of evidence. For
confessions and eyewitness identifications, courts have routinely exercised
a limited gatekeeping role confined to reviewing the prosecution’s evidence
for possible constitutional violations.182 Remarkably, informant testimony
is generally admitted without any type of reliability or constitutional
screening by courts.183
179

Id. at 285–86.
For information about the jurisdictions that have adopted best practices in eyewitness
identifications, confessions, and the use of informants, see supra notes 126 & 136.
181
See infra notes 236–40 and accompanying text.
182
Confessions must comply with the due process “voluntariness” test, the rule in
Miranda v. Arizona, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See LEO, supra note 10, at
272–83. Identification testimony must meet the due process requirements set forth in
Manson v. Brathwaite and the extremely limited right to counsel. See Judicial Blindness,
supra note 111, at 1509–14 (addressing right to counsel and due process rights for
eyewitness identifications).
183
See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 58–60 (explaining that the central protection against
use of informant testimony is the requirement that the government turn over certain
information about the informant to the defense; only Illinois requires a reliability hearing for
informants in capital cases and Texas requires corroboration). With the recent repeal of the
death penalty in Illinois, this protection for capital cases is no longer needed. See supra note
8. California now also requires corroboration of informant testimony. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1111.5 (West Supp. 2011). Of course, cross-examination on the basis of the
disclosed information serves to test the reliability of the informant. However, due to the
limits of the disclosure requirements as well as numerous documented cases of prosecutorial
misconduct in failing to disclose such information, defense counsel may not have the ability
180
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The following sections reveal the inadequacies of current due process
screening as a means of ensuring the reliability of police-generated witness
testimony. They also show that courts have engaged in reliability
gatekeeping under the rules of evidence for various types of lay witness
testimony, most often to exclude defense witnesses.
A. DUE PROCESS FAILS TO ENSURE RELIABILITY

Due process under federal law has only limited effectiveness in
regulating police-generated witness testimony. With regard to informant
testimony, due process fundamental fairness may call for exclusion, but
only in cases where the defense can show “outrageous government
conduct” in using the informant to manufacture the evidence and set up a
person who was not otherwise involved in criminal activity.184 The more
typical jailhouse informant provides information about a person who has
already been arrested, so this application of due process would not apply.
For jailhouse informant testimony, the central constitutional protections
require limited disclosure and discovery of “impeachment material”
regarding the informant.185 Due process has not been applied to require a
reliability assessment by the courts.
For confessions and identifications, due process protects against
inappropriate police procedures in gathering the evidence, which may affect
reliability. However, unreliability without more does not mandate
exclusion under federal due process law. The Supreme Court has made it
clear that no matter how unreliable a confession may be, unless it is a
product of overreaching state action, no due process violation occurs.186
Moreover, the defense must show that the overreaching by the police
caused the defendant to confess.187 In Colorado v. Connelly, the defendant,
who suffered from schizophrenia, confessed and provided critical details
about a previously unsolved murder.188 There was no suggestion that the
to conduct an effective cross-examination. See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 58–60 (noting
limited nature of discovery requirements); see also Raeder, supra note 132, at 1439–47
(arguing that current constitutional jurisprudence does not promote sufficiently high
standards of ethical behavior relating to the disclosure of informant information).
184
See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 61.
185
See id. at 58.
186
Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of
Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 609–11 (2006) (discussing
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986)).
187
Id. at 610–11; see also Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions
Discovered, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 623, 624–28 (2007) (tracing the historical treatment of
reliability in confessions law to the present day, in which it is no longer an independently
relevant factor).
188
Marcus, supra note 186, at 610–11.
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police had in any way coerced Connelly to confess. The Court thus found
no due process violation.
Viewed purely as a matter of evidentiary reliability, Connelly’s
confession may well have been reliable. If he provided the police with
important information about a murder that would only have been known to
the killer—and which was not even known to the police at the time—then it
is likely his confession was true. The point here is that under the due
process analysis, courts are not required to make a reliability determination
as a condition of admissibility. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that
reliability per se should be treated as an evidentiary concern, not a
constitutional one.189
What makes matters worse is that even when there is evidence of
police lies, threats, and other coercive conduct, the due process
voluntariness test fails to ensure the reliability of the suspect’s statements.
After reviewing thousands of cases from the 1990s and 2000s challenging
the voluntariness of confessions, Paul Marcus concludes:
One necessarily comes away with a feeling of being unclean and tainted by
government activities that are not honorable even given the environment needed for
interrogations. Many judges allow confessions into evidence in cases in which police
interrogators lied and threatened defendants or played on the mental, emotional, or
physical weaknesses of suspects. While judges write that they do not condone such
conduct and find such practices repugnant, reprehensible, or deplorable, some of those
same judges have upheld the admission of such confessions that result from those
190
practices after applying the totality of circumstances test.

It bears noting as well that the due process voluntariness test does not take
into account whether critical best practices have been followed, such as
videotaping, lack of contamination by suggesting facts of the crime, and
independent corroborating evidence.
In judging eyewitness identifications, the Supreme Court considers
reliability the “linchpin” of its due process analysis.191 Yet scholars have
consistently bemoaned the many failures of the test as a reliabilityscreening tool.192 First, as with confessions, due process only protects
against inappropriate evidence-gathering procedures. But unreliability due

189

See Garrett, supra note 73, at 1091–92 (“The Court summarized the turn in its
jurisprudence, stating that though a confession statement ‘might be proved to be quite
unreliable . . . this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, . . . not by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 167 (1986))).
190
Marcus, supra note 186, at 643 (footnotes omitted).
191
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
192
See, e.g., Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 607 n. 21 (listing citations).
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solely to other causes is not a sufficient ground for exclusion.193 The
fundamental unfairness of being convicted largely or even solely on
patently unreliable identification evidence has no federal due process
traction, unless the police also acted in an unduly suggestive way.194
Second, even if the police do use unduly suggestive procedures, due
process does not require exclusion if the identification is nonetheless
reliable. Reliability, as the Court defines it, does not take police
suggestiveness into account.195 The Court’s reliability checklist ignores the
several ways in which police suggestiveness can produce and reinforce a
false identification. Instead, it provides what has come to be an exclusive
list of five factors that bear on reliability. Four of the factors take into
account characteristics of the witness and the circumstances surrounding the
viewing, which are appropriate considerations in a reliability assessment.196
However, one of the factors listed by the Court (which federal courts are
still required to consider) has been scientifically shown not to have a
bearing on reliability—“the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
at the confrontation.”197 One might take the view that this reliability test is
mostly appropriate and good enough, until one considers all the other
relevant factors that are missing. The most crucial omissions are whether
the identification was cross-racial and whether the witness was intrinsically
less reliable due to age, mental ability, or intoxication.198 It also bears
reiterating that whether the identification was “reliable” (applying the
Court’s definition of the term) ultimately does determine admissibility, but
the Court’s definition of reliability omits the critical factors of police
suggestiveness or coercion, witness vulnerability, and cross-racial
identifications.199
Some state courts have tweaked the Manson test by discarding factors
that have been shown not to correlate with reliability and incorporating
193

Id. at 610–13 (explaining that identification does not violate due process unless a
threshold finding is made that police used suggestive practices; thus, courts do not reach the
reliability issue unless the police are found to have acted improperly).
194
Id.
195
Id. at 612.
196
Here I refer to “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the
criminal, . . . and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972); see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 104
(1977).
197
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 611 n.44, 613.
198
See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1501–03 (cross-racial
identifications and age); Judicial Blindness, supra note 111, at 644 (witness intoxication and
age).
199
See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 612.

368

SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON

[Vol. 102

important factors that do bear on reliability.200 These judicial fixes have not
gone so far as to mandate that police follow best practices.
In its landmark decision of State v. Henderson, the New Jersey
Supreme Court completely sidestepped the Manson due process test for
identifications on the grounds that it fails to meet any of the reliability goals
set for it. Instead the court replaced the test with a mandate for pretrial
reliability hearings which take into account whether the police have
followed best practices.201
In short, neither the “voluntariness” test for confessions nor the
“reliability” test for identifications ultimately protects against unreliable
evidence. The many wrongful convictions produced by confessions and
identifications that passed muster under these anemic constitutional tests lay
bare this truth.202
B. CURRENT PRACTICES IN RELIABILITY SCREENING FOR LAY
WITNESS TESTIMONY

While police-generated witness testimony has not traditionally been
subject to effective reliability screening, there is certainly precedent for
such screening in relation to other types of evidence. The most instructive
example involves the testimony of the lay witness whose memory has been
hypnotically refreshed. The Supreme Court found that the preferred
approach is for courts to conduct pretrial reliability screening to ensure that
the evidence has been generated by professionals following accepted
protocols.
Hypnotically refreshed witness testimony raises reliability concerns
strikingly similar to those raised by police-generated witness testimony: (1)
hypnosis makes a witness more vulnerable to the memory-distorting effects
of suggestion; (2) biased interrogators may use suggestive questioning in
order to elicit certain desired statements; (3) the process of suggestive
questioning of a hypnotized subject may cause the subject to

200

Id. at 623–26.
For a full discussion of the Court’s opinion in State v. Henderson, see infra notes
316–25 and accompanying text.
202
A few states have abandoned the federal test and instead apply a per se exclusionary
rule for unnecessarily suggestive identifications. See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note
36, at 623 (Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin (only for show-ups in Wisconsin)).
Only the Utah Supreme Court has so modified the Manson test as to make it consistent with
scientific studies by excluding the witness confidence prong and adding other critical
considerations such as cross-racial identifications and police suggestion. Id. at 625–26.
201
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“confabulate”;203 and thus (4) a witness may experience a heightened and
unwarranted degree of confidence in the memory.204
In Rock v. Arkansas, when the defense offered to introduce the
defendant’s own hypnotically refreshed testimony, the prosecution filed a
motion to exclude the testimony, and the trial court held a reliability hearing
to determine its admissibility.205 The trial court, applying a per se rule
excluding such testimony as unreliable, limited the defendant’s testimony to
memories that had been shared with the examiner before hypnosis.206 In
overturning the defendant’s conviction, the Supreme Court found that such
a per se exclusion violated the defendant’s right to present a meaningful
defense.207 In lieu of categorical exclusion on grounds of unreliability, the
Court suggested a case-by-case judicial assessment of reliability.208 The
Court clearly contemplated that trial courts should exercise their discretion
in ruling on the admissibility of this type of evidence on grounds of
reliability.209
The Court pointed to the use of procedural safeguards as a means of
reducing inaccuracies in the testimony. The Court stated:
One set of suggested guidelines calls for hypnosis to be performed only by a
psychologist or psychiatrist with special training in its use and who is independent of
the investigation. These procedures reduce the possibility that biases will be
communicated to the hypersuggestive subject by the hypnotist. Suggestion will be
less likely also if the hypnosis is conducted in a neutral setting with no one present but
the hypnotist and the subject. Tape or video recording of all interrogations, before,
210
during, and after hypnosis, can help reveal if leading questions were asked.

Thus, the Court indicated that in assessing the reliability of the
evidence, lower courts may consider whether recommended procedural
203

To confabulate means to “fill in the details from the imagination in order to make an
answer more coherent and complete.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 60 (1987).
204
See Daniel R. Webert, Note, Are the Courts in a Trance? Approaches to the
Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Witness Testimony in Light of Empirical Evidence,
40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1301, 1304–06 (2003). One expert testified that hypnotized subjects
display the same degree of suggestibility and the same tendency to confabulate or to develop
unwarranted confidence in their memories as witnesses who undergo traditional
interrogation techniques. Id. at 1314.
205
Rock, 483 U.S. at 47.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 62.
208
Id. at 61.
209
For example, the role of the trial court in ruling on admissibility is clearly
communicated in the following statement: “The State would be well within its powers if it
established guidelines to aid trial courts in the evaluation of posthypnosis testimony and it
may be able to show that testimony in a particular case is so unreliable that exclusion is
justified.” Id.
210
Id. at 60.
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safeguards were followed. These include the use of trained interviewers,
non-suggestive questioning, independence of the interviewer from the
investigation, and audio or videotaping of the entire interrogation. These
guidelines bear an eerie resemblance to those proposed for confessions,
informant statements, and eyewitness identification evidence.211 The Court
also noted that the evidence can be tested by more traditional means, such
as the presence of corroborating evidence, as well as typical trial safeguards
such as cross-examination, jury instructions, and expert witnesses.212
Courts have also occasionally conducted reliability hearings when the
prosecution offers the testimony of child victims in sexual assault cases.213
The use of child-victim testimony raises concerns similar to those raised by
police-generated testimony.214 When young children are questioned about
possible victimization, research has shown that overly zealous and
suggestive questioning can cause children to make false allegations of
sexual assault.215 Scholars have called for a variety of reforms (many of
211

See supra Part II.B.
Rock, 483 U.S. at 61.
213
See generally Ashish S. Joshi, Taint Hearing: Scientific and Legal Underpinnings, 34
CHAMPION 36 (2010) (arguing that courts should determine the admissibility of child-witness
testimony on the basis of Rule 602, which disqualifies a witness who does not testify from
personal knowledge).
214
There are differences between the use of police-generated witness testimony and the
statements of child victims that may suggest the need for different remedies. For example,
with young child victims, the first persons to question them about the possible assaults are
family members or teachers, not law enforcement agents. Other individuals often involved
in questioning include doctors, nurses, and social workers. Most often the first questioners
are not trained to conduct interviews with child victims, nor are they equipped to videotape
the interviews. See Kimberly Y. Chin, “Minute and Separate”: Considering the
Admissibility of Videotaped Forensic Interviews in Child Sexual Abuse Cases After
Crawford and Davis, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 84–85 (2010). Another difference is
that in cases of alleged child abuse, a wrongful conviction usually means that no crime
occurred, whereas erroneous eyewitness identifications and false confessions produce
convictions of the wrong person. See Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences
in Preventing Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271, 1284 (2005).
On the question of how jurors perceive child-witness testimony, some studies suggest
that jurors tend to view them as unreliable due to suggestibility. See Chin, supra at 85.
However, other research indicates that jurors are likely to believe that a young child will not
fabricate allegations of sexual abuse, even when the evidence shows that the interviewer
suggested that something sexual occurred. See McMurtrie, supra at 1284–85. Thus, it is not
entirely clear whether jurors are as likely to credit unreliable child-witness evidence as they
are to credit unreliable police-generated witness testimony. See infra notes 298–07 and
accompanying text.
215
See Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific
Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. Rev. 33, 71 (2000) (summarizing data
showing a broad consensus that young children are highly suggestible and vulnerable to
strongly suggestive questioning); Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the
Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 927,
212
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which have improved the quality of child-witness testimony216) and for
courts to conduct “taint” hearings to determine the reliability of the child’s
statements.217 Although courts do not often conduct taint hearings,218 when
they do, they generally invoke Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which conditions a witness’s competency to testify on the witness’s ability
to testify from personal knowledge,219 or the Due Process Clause.220 These
hearings have been conducted only in cases in which the child will testify,
but in many cases the children do not testify.221 Instead, prosecutors offer
the testimony of adult witnesses who testify to the child’s prior statements
regarding the sexual assault. The hearsay rules permit a child’s statements
to be introduced by other witnesses,222 just as other hearsay rules allow
933–40 (1993) (addressing social science research showing that suggestive pretrial
“interrogation” of child witnesses can unwittingly manufacture false accusations); John E.B.
Myers, Taint Hearings for Child Witnesses? A Step in the Wrong Direction, 46 BAYLOR L.
REV. 873, 880–84 (1994) (noting a prevalence of overzealousness and excessive use of
leading questions in interviews of children regarding possible sexual assault).
On a related note, witnesses with mental disabilities may also be vulnerable to the
same types of issues that apply to child-witness testimony. For a discussion of the
challenges facing a mentally disabled victim and witness in a sexual assault case, see
generally Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women
with Mental Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural Issues, 52 MCGILL L.J. 515 (2007).
216
See Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual Abuse in
Criminal and Maltreatment Cases: Why Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child
Testimony, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 239, 242–46 (2010) (addressing changes to protocols that
have eliminated suggestive questioning of children and highlighting research that refutes
other studies on the unreliability or suggestibility of young children).
217
See Joshi, supra note 213, at 36 (calling for taint hearings to ascertain whether the
child witness is competent to testify from personal knowledge); Ceci & Friedman, supra
note 215, at 86–106 (addressing improvements in taint hearings, hearsay rules, use of expert
witnesses, and videotaping); Montoya, supra note 215, at 940–86 (arguing for the
videotaping of child-victim interviews and reform of the hearsay rules). However, in an
article that predates most DNA exonerations, another author rejects reliability hearings
(called “taint hearings”) for child witnesses who have undergone interviewing regarding
allegations of sexual assault on the basis that such hearings will make it more difficult to
obtain convictions in these cases, thus putting children at greater risk of sexual assault.
Myers, supra note 215, at 889. The author reached this conclusion despite acknowledging
that taint hearings would improve the interviewing techniques used by government agents
and safeguard fundamental fairness. Id. at 888–902.
218
In most cases, either the child is old enough to testify without raising the concerns
about the suggestibility of very young children, or the child need not testify at all. See also
infra note 222 and accompanying text.
219
See Joshi, supra note 213, at 38–40 (citing cases).
220
See Myers, supra note 215, at 884–89 (discussing a seminal New Jersey Supreme
Court decision, State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994)).
221
See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 215, at 93; Chin, supra note 214, at 86.
222
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide hearsay exceptions for the out-of-court
statements of declarants that are made “for [purposes of] medical diagnosis or treatment.”
FED. R. EVID. 803(4). There is disagreement among lower courts, however, as to whether
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police officers or informants to testify to the prior statements of
defendants.223 Thus, like police-generated witness testimony, child-victim
statements made by adult witnesses become routinely admissible by
operation of the hearsay rules, without any judicial reliability screening.
Other evidence rules have required rigorous reliability screening for
various other types of lay witness testimony; however, with few exceptions,
these rigorous standards in criminal cases have mostly applied to witnesses
proffered by one party—the defense.224 What is most remarkable about this
this exception should admit statements regarding the identity of the perpetrator as those
statements may not be pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment. CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.42, at 837–39 (3d ed. 2003). The
statements of children to doctors, nurses, and possibly social workers can generally qualify
for admission under this exception. Statements to family members about current symptoms
and pains, or emotions such as distress or fear are usually admissible under the hearsay
exception for statements of a declarant’s “then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent,
or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as . . . mental feeling, pain, or
bodily health).” FED. R. EVID. 803(3). Again, this exception would not ordinarily permit
statements relating to past events, such as the cause of the current feelings or condition. The
exception is restricted to “then existing” feelings and does not allow statements “of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.” Id. If the statements are made close in
time to the time when the assault took place, the statements may also qualify under the
exception for excited utterances (“statement[s] relating to a startling event or condition,
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement [caused by the event or
condition]”). FED. R. EVID. 803(2). See generally Myrna S. Raeder, Finding the Proper
Balance in Hearsay Policy: The Uniform Rules Attempt to Stem the Hearsay Tide in
Criminal Cases Without Prohibiting All Nontraditional Hearsay, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 631, 634,
639–41 (2001) (arguing that courts have read hearsay exceptions like excited utterances and
medical statements in order to allow children’s statements to be heard and advocating for the
Uniform Rules of Evidence approach, which provides better guidance to courts and better
assures trustworthiness).
The Supreme Court’s approach to the Confrontation Clause poses an obstacle to the
admission of the hearsay statements of children in sexual assault cases when they are made
for the purpose of investigating a crime. See Chin, supra note 214, at 93–98. Statements
made to police officers or social workers, if made for the purpose of reporting a crime, are
considered “testimonial.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). Testimonial
statements are not admissible in a criminal case unless the witness is unavailable to testify
and there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. Other nontestimonial
statements made for purposes other than reporting a crime to law enforcement may be
admissible under the hearsay exceptions, see supra this note, and the Confrontation Clause
would not preclude admission.
223
See infra notes 275–84. The reliability issues that surround child-witness hearsay
statements parallel those of police-generated witness testimony. Although it is beyond the
scope of this Article, it would appear that many of the same arguments for pretrial reliability
hearings regarding police-generated witness testimony can also be made with regard to the
hearsay statements of child witnesses.
224
Other authors have noted the apparent bias in admitting prosecution evidence and
excluding defense evidence. See, e.g., Yvette J. Bessent, Not So Fast: Admissibility of
Polygraph Evidence and Repressed Memory Evidence When Offered by the Accused, 55 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 975, 975–76 (2001) (finding a “strong indication” that admittance depends on
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apparent lack of evenhandedness is that the imbalance ought to run in the
opposite direction. First, it is of course the government’s burden to
establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.225 For a trial to
be fair, the government’s evidence should meet reasonable standards of
reliability. Second, the exclusion of defense evidence implicates the
constitutional right of an accused to present a meaningful defense.226 In
contrast, the government and parties to a civil suit can assert no protected
right to admit evidence. Thus, one would expect that reliability screening
would apply with greater force to the prosecution than to the defense, but,
ironically, the opposite is apparently true.227
The three types of prosecution evidence considered here undergo
virtually no reliability screening, but defense witness testimony is routinely
excluded or limited on reliability grounds.228 In fact, there are several
instances in which the same type of evidence may be admissible if offered
by the prosecution but inadmissible on unreliability grounds if offered by
the defense. The testimony of a jailhouse informant provides a poignant
example. If a jailhouse cellmate steps forward and offers to testify for the
prosecution that a defendant admitted committing a crime, this evidence

which party seeks to offer the evidence and that courts admit polygraph evidence when
offered by the prosecution but exclude it when offered by the defense); D. Michael Risinger,
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?,
64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 131–32 (2000) (rejecting a general pro-prosecution bias, but nonetheless
finding “serious specific pro-prosecution disparities” such as the nearly universal admission
of “summarizational” or educational expert witnesses offered by the prosecution and the
exclusion of a majority of such experts offered by the defense); see also Katherine
Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom About Excluding Defense
Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621, 631–32 (1998) (arguing that state and federal courts too often
exclude defense evidence of third-party exculpatory statements on unreliability grounds).
225
See Goldwasser, supra note 224, at 633–36 (addressing the conflict between the
exclusion of defense evidence and the principles that underlie the burden of proof in criminal
cases).
226
A defendant in a criminal case ostensibly enjoys a special due process right to offer
evidence, deriving from the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006).
227
See Goldwasser, supra note 224, at 635 (arguing that exclusion of prosecution
evidence on unreliability grounds is consistent with the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, whereas a reliability-based exclusion of defense evidence is not).
228
The same goes for expert witnesses as well. Forensic experts offered by the
government are routinely admitted, in many cases despite the fact that they fail to meet the
reliability standards set forth in Daubert. Defense experts, however, fare far less well. See
Risinger, supra note 224, at 131–35 (discussing an empirical study finding pro-prosecution
disparity in admitting “summarizational” or “educational” experts). Much of the blame for
the admission of faulty forensic science can be placed at the feet of the defense bar, which
largely failed to challenge the bogus science. See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 11, at 2.
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will encounter no evidentiary obstacles whatsoever.229 However, if a
jailhouse cellmate offers to testify for the defense regarding a third party’s
confession to the crime for which the defendant is being tried, this evidence
will normally not be admitted unless the defense also shows “corroborating
circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.”230
The case law on the “right to present a defense” reveals just how many
evidentiary rules have attempted to place special limits on the right of
criminal defendants to present evidence, without imposing those same
restrictions on prosecution evidence.231 Although the Supreme Court has
struck down or softened many of these restrictions, one is left to wonder
why state evidentiary rules have attempted strict reliability gatekeeping
only for defense evidence.232 In the end, the courts either have it half right
229

As offered by the prosecution, the informant’s testimony about the defendant’s own
statement is admissible under the hearsay rules as an “[o]pposing [p]arty’s [s]tatement.” See
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
230
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(A) admits hearsay statements made by a declarant who is
unavailable to testify and that are “against interest,” which as applied here means the
statement “had so great a tendency . . . to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability
. . . .” The declarant in this scenario is a third party who would presumably invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege not to testify regarding matters that would incriminate the person.
Thus, the declarant is considered unavailable. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1). For all other
statements against interest, the exception requires only that the statement be “against
interest” and that the declarant be “unavailable.” However, an additional requirement
applies to third-party statements offered to expose the declarant to criminal liability (thereby
presumably relieving the defendant of liability): the statement must also be supported by
“corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness.” See FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(3)(B).
231
The rules considered by the Court over the years vary from categorical exclusion of
certain types of defense evidence to rules that require certain guarantees of trustworthiness
for the evidence to be admitted. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302–03 (1973)
(holding that a defendant’s right to present a defense is violated by hearsay rules that
combined to exclude defense witnesses who would testify to a third-party’s confession and
prevented the defense from cross-examining that same third party); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 22, 23 (1967) (striking down the categorical exclusion of testimony provided by
persons charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories in the same crime when testifying
as witnesses for each other, but which allowed the prosecution to call accomplices to testify
against the defendant).
232
Some attribute rules that disadvantage defendants and make convictions easier to
obtain to a fear that defendants in criminal cases may too easily evade prosecution by
fabricating a defense. See, e.g., David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the
Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359, 376 (1985) (defending the felony
murder rule, which eliminates the requirement that the government prove criminal intent to
kill, on the ground that “any other approach would unduly reward perjury [because] [t]he
denial of harmful intent in such a situation is too facile.”). The prospect of easy acquittals
due to fabricated defenses that may raise reasonable doubts may lead some to cut defendants
off at the pass by restricting the right to raise a defense at all. See, e.g., People v. Williams,
841 P.2d 961, 971 (Cal. 1992) (Mosk, J., concurring) (“Beneath the surface of the majority
opinion, there seems a fear that . . . a defendant may too easily fabricate a reasonable-and-
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by screening defense evidence while erroneously failing to apply the same
standards to prosecution evidence, or the courts have gotten it completely
backwards since defendants should have a greater right to offer evidence
given the defendant’s constitutional right to present a meaningful
defense.233 Either way, it is obvious that reliability screening of policegenerated witness testimony is long overdue.
IV. PRETRIAL RELIABILITY HEARINGS FOR POLICE-GENERATED
WITNESS TESTIMONY
Critical evidence such as a confession or an eyewitness identification
makes or breaks the government’s case. Studies of DNA exonerations and
jury behavior show that there are “islands of trouble” among the sea of
criminal cases.234 Suggestive or coercive tactics by the police can lead
witnesses to make erroneous or false statements, especially when the
witnesses are particularly vulnerable, like juveniles and the intellectually
disabled or mentally ill.235 Police officers can also contaminate the process
by revealing information about the crime or suspect to the witness,
prompting the witness to incorporate that information into his or her own
statement. Evaluating the reliability of police-generated testimony requires
a thorough understanding of the dangers of police–witness interactions and
the emerging best practices for addressing those dangers. Although not as
complex as evaluating the myriad types of scientific evidence, the task of
understanding the pitfalls of eyewitness identifications, custodial
interrogations, and the use of informants cannot practicably be taught to
jurors during the course of a trial, nor would it be an efficient use of trial
resources. Thus, the gatekeeping role rightly lies with judges.
Common sense tells us this gatekeeping should occur as early in the
litigation process as possible.236 For confessions based on custodial
honest-belief defense through his own false testimony, and should accordingly be denied the
defense unless he is supported by corroborating evidence.”).
Findley argues that courts can suffer from the same tunnel vision as police and
prosecutors. Instead of a system that protects the innocent, he observes an overall skewing
of the judicial system in favor of the government. Findley, supra note 11, at 896.
233
See Goldwasser, supra note 224, at 635–36.
234
I borrow the term “islands of trouble” from Michael Risinger who used it to describe
the “substructured” nature of wrongful convictions, which have been found to occur more
often within some types of crimes, or under some circumstances, than others. See Risinger,
supra note 42, at 785.
235
See supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text.
236
See generally Findley, supra note 11, at 911 (arguing that rules of evidence already
incorporate some forms of gatekeeping for reliability). Among advocacy groups, the Justice
Project had recommended pretrial reliability hearings for jailhouse informants and
confessions. See supra note 126.
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interrogations, Leo and Garrett have each made the case for pretrial
reliability hearings.237 Leo argues that the reliability issue should be
considered only after the constitutional voluntariness issue.238 He states that
since truth or falsity is not relevant to the voluntariness inquiry, the court
should not determine “reliability” first (in effect, finding the confession
likely to be true), as that might improperly influence the courts’ decisions
on voluntariness.239 Similar proposals have been made regarding informant
testimony and eyewitness identifications. Natapoff has called for pretrial
reliability hearings for police informant testimony.240 Thus, experts writing
in each of these fields have called upon the judiciary to protect the rights of
the innocent by carefully screening key prosecution evidence before trial.
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s momentous decision in State v.
Henderson requires pretrial reliability hearings for eyewitness
identifications obtained by suggestive means.241 In embracing a new
approach to judicial screening for identifications, New Jersey became the
first state to require courts to engage in pretrial reliability hearings for a
commonly admitted type of lay witness testimony in all criminal cases.242
The court adopted the requirement upon the recommendations of a special
master that the court had appointed to conduct extensive hearings. The
Henderson opinion draws upon the voluminous scientific research and the
testimony of numerous scientific experts considered by the special master,
as well as the recommendations of the parties. As such, the decision
provides an outstanding summary of the scientific literature on eyewitness
identification as applied to criminal cases. It provides excellent guidance
for lower courts in New Jersey on how to conduct pretrial reliability
hearings for this type of evidence, and it can serve as a model for state
courts across the country.

237
See LEO, supra note 10, at 289–91. Garrett argues that courts could question the
ordinary presumption of reliability of confessions by assessing whether crucial facts were in
fact volunteered by the defendant. Garrett, supra note 73, at 1111. The assessment would
benefit most from access to a video recording of the interrogation, which is the leading
reform proposed for interrogations. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
238
LEO, supra note 10, at 290.
239
Id.
240
See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 190–91, 194–95.
241
27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); see also State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930 (N.J. 2011) (companion
case applying the Henderson framework under state rules of evidence to eyewitness
identifications tainted by private-party suggestion). For a full discussion of the Henderson
decision, see infra notes 315–24 and accompanying text.
242
Previously, Illinois was the only state to impose a statutory requirement to conduct
pretrial reliability hearings for informant testimony, but this requirement applied only to
capital cases. See supra note 183. With the recent repeal of the death penalty in Illinois, this
provision is no longer needed. See supra note 8.
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The breakthrough in New Jersey, while certainly a milestone, does not
necessarily mean that other states will follow suit, and currently even New
Jersey does not provide such hearings for confessions or informant
testimony.243 A critic of pretrial reliability hearings might argue that such
hearings introduce inefficiencies by creating a trial within a trial and that
they are unnecessary because trial procedures like cross-examination, jury
instructions, and expert witnesses can adequately safeguard against
wrongful convictions. One might also challenge the use of such a hearing
as invading the province of the jury and misunderstanding the proper role of
the judge as gatekeeper. Finally, a constant worry about reforms aimed at
curbing wrongful convictions is that they will limit the availability of good,
reliable evidence and impair the government’s ability to obtain convictions
in violent crime cases, thereby jeopardizing the public safety.
The following sections of the Article challenge this critique and
outline the doctrinal basis for a court’s authority to hold such pretrial
hearings on reliability for all three forms of police-generated witness
testimony considered here. They draw on the Henderson decision, as well
as the lessons of the DNA exoneration cases, to provide guidance on the
considerations that courts could take into account in assessing each form of
evidence. By holding hearings on reliability, courts will incentivize the
police and prosecutors to adopt practices that promote reliability: avoiding
contamination of witness testimony; using less coercive or suggestive
tactics, especially with vulnerable individuals; and properly documenting
interviews, preferably through videotaping. By establishing best practices
as the benchmark by which courts will review police practices in these
areas, courts also necessarily broaden the scope of pretrial discovery to
include the procedures by which these critical forms of evidence are
produced. The hearings afford the court the opportunity to fashion
appropriate intermediate approaches to less-than-reliable identifications, in
addition to the all-or-nothing decision to admit or exclude.244 As was
explicitly mandated in Henderson, trial courts can produce factual findings
at pretrial reliability hearings that serve to foster effective appellate review
and advance other goals as well.245

243

Illinois represents a minor exception for informant testimony. Id.
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 915, 918–19 (making this argument in the limited context of
identification testimony).
245
Id. at 928.
244
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A. DISCOVERY AND PRETRIAL HEARINGS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE

The early stages of the criminal trial process involve the gathering and
evaluation of evidence, among other things. Defense attorneys normally
file motions for discovery soon after a defendant is arraigned. This motion
requests information pertaining to any and all pretrial identifications of the
defendant by any eyewitnesses.246 It also requests impeachment material,
information about witnesses, and information about any and all statements
attributed to the defendant by any witnesses. Any reform in the area of
confessions, informant statements, and eyewitness identifications should
begin with improved discovery mechanisms,247 especially in the area of
informant testimony.248 A reliability challenge necessitates that defense
counsel knows the circumstances under which the evidence was generated
by the police. Thus, it necessarily encompasses a requirement that the
government provide adequate discovery.249
In general, criminal discovery has not well served the function of
eliminating trial by surprise, and this failing puts the innocent in extreme
jeopardy.250 The problem is most acute with regard to the use of police
informants. Natapoff argues that prosecutors should have an affirmative
duty to produce the pertinent impeachment information regarding any
police-informant witness.251 For various reasons, law enforcement may be
reluctant to provide such information, even to prosecutors, and prosecutors
246

See Wise, Fishman & Safer, supra note 1, at 450–51.
See generally Stephanos Bibas et al., New Perspectives on Brady and Other
Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961 (2010) (reporting on the recommendations of working groups of academics,
judges, social science experts, and practitioners regarding best practices for criminal
discovery).
248
See infra notes 251–52 and accompanying text.
249
See, e.g., Henderson, 27 A.3d at 923 (noting that by expanding upon the factors
courts should consider when reviewing the admissibility of eyewitness identifications, the
court had effectively broadened the defense right to pretrial discovery).
250
Findley speaks even more broadly about the defendant’s general disadvantage in
evidence gathering:
247

[C]riminal defendants are at a vast disadvantage in their ability to investigate and develop
evidence. For the most part, the only way defendants can now gain access to crime scene
evidence is through discovery, which means they must depend on the prosecutor to identify and
disclose such information as the prosecutor believes the defense is entitled to have. But
discovery is notoriously limited in criminal cases, especially when compared to the extensive and
wide-open discovery available in civil cases. Ironically, litigants fighting over money have far
more access to the facts and evidence than does an innocent person wrongly accused and facing
many years or life in prison, or even death.

Findley, supra note 11, at 901 (footnotes omitted).
251
See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 74–76, 192.
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have few incentives to request impeachment material about their
witnesses.252
With regard to confessions, the rules of evidence require that courts
hold hearings out of the hearing of the jury on the admissibility of
confessions.253 Thus, it makes sense that the hearing would take place
pretrial, at the same time as the likely challenge on constitutional grounds.
The rules also call for holding hearings outside of the hearing of the jury for
other preliminary matters as “justice so requires.”254 In cases in which
eyewitness identification or informant testimony is the critical item of
evidence, and where there is no reliable corroborating evidence, the
identification or informant evidence poses a great risk of wrongly
convicting the innocent defendant.255 Thus, the “interests of justice” surely
require hearings outside of the presence of the jury.
The nature of all three forms of police-generated witness testimony
addressed here also calls for the hearings to be held pretrial.256 If policegenerated witness testimony is excluded on reliability grounds, in many
cases the prosecutor will move to dismiss the case. Early resolution for an
innocent defendant avoids an unnecessarily prolonged ordeal and
maximizes judicial efficiency. Pretrial rulings also allow the parties to
prepare for voir dire and trial.
B. JUDGING RELIABILITY UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE

The rules of evidence vest courts with the discretion to exclude
evidence that is shown to be both potentially unreliable and difficult for the
jury to evaluate, thus posing a greater risk of precipitating an inaccurate
verdict. The Supreme Court has made this abundantly clear in its
application of the rules of evidence to scientific evidence. In Daubert,257
the Court addressed the applicable standards for admitting scientific expert
testimony. Rule 702 specifically governs scientific evidence and requires
that it be based on valid scientific knowledge and that it will be helpful to
the jury.258 The Court interpreted Rule 702 as calling for a reliability
analysis.259 Presumably, the Court could have relied solely on Rule 702,
but instead it also invoked Rule 403 in support of a judicial role to assess

252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

Id.
See FED. R. EVID. 104(c).
See FED. R. EVID. 104(c)(3).
See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text.
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
FED. R. EVID. 702.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–93.
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reliability.260 The Court thereby linked its finding that Rule 702 requires
“reliability” with Rule 403’s grant of authority to courts to exclude relevant
evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risks
of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury.261 The Court justified the
heightened judicial oversight on the grounds that the nature of scientific
opinion offered by an expert makes it at once more powerful and more
difficult to evaluate.262 The Court appropriately invoked Rule 403 as
grounds for judicial gatekeeping on reliability because the rule applies in
conjunction with other more specific rules of evidence and because its
underlying purpose is to secure the integrity of the trial process.263
A similar reading of Rules 701 and 602 gives trial courts the discretion
to conduct gatekeeping for lay witness testimony that presents grave risks
of misleading the jury. Confessions, informant testimony, and eyewitness
identification testimony are introduced as lay witness testimony. 264 Rule
701 requires that where lay witnesses offer opinion testimony, the
testimony must be “rationally based on the witness’s perception” and
“helpful to . . . determining a fact in issue.”265 Rule 602 provides that
witnesses must testify from “personal knowledge.”266 Eyewitnesses provide
opinion testimony regarding the identity of the culprit, and experience
shows that those opinions may be greatly affected by suggestive
practices.267 Similarly, when police officers or government informants
testify to a defendant’s incriminating statements they inherently
communicate their own opinions that that defendant spoke voluntarily and
260
Id. at 594–95. Rule 403 provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
261
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95.
262
Id. at 595.
263
See also infra notes 269–72 and accompanying text.
264
Lay witnesses are defined as all witnesses who are not expert witnesses. See FED. R.
EVID. 701. In the common parlance of trial practice, these are considered “fact witnesses” in
that they provide the testimony proving the facts of the case.
265
See FED. R. EVID. 701.
266
See FED. R. EVID. 602.
267
The Advisory Committee’s Notes contemplated that statements of identity and other
estimates of matters such as size, weight, and distance would normally be admissible as
opinions under Rule 701. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (2000
Amendment). In interpreting a different rule of evidence, the Supreme Court refused to
differentiate “factual findings” from “conclusions or opinion,” instead determining that
“factual findings” include “conclusions or opinions that flow from a factual investigation”
and not simply “facts.” See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163–64 (1988).
Thus, courts can properly invoke Rule 701 in considering the admissibility of ostensibly
“factual” statements that experience has shown are more akin to opinions that draw on a
variety of factors and that can be affected by outside influences such as suggestive practices.
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sincerely in implicating himself. Rules 701 and 602, considered together,
authorize courts to screen such testimony to determine its reliability based
on the extent to which the police followed best practices in obtaining the
witness’s testimony. In State v. Chen, a companion case to Henderson in
New Jersey, the state high court came to this conclusion in the context of
eyewitness identification evidence.268
As was done in Daubert, courts should also rely on Rule 403 as
authority for reliability screening of police-generated lay witness testimony.
Rule 403 “represents a key organizing principle for understanding the
practical application and ethos of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”269 Stated
more as a general principle than a specific rule, Rule 403, more than any
other rule, makes the rules adaptable so that they retain force even under
circumstances unforeseen to the drafters. It “epitomizes the trial judge’s
vast discretion in admitting or excluding evidence, a hallmark of our
judicial system.”270 As one authority explains, Rule 403 gives courts
leeway to exclude “relevant evidence [that may] confuse, or worse, mislead
a trier of fact who is not properly equipped to judge the probative worth of
the evidence.”271 Indeed, courts uniformly understand Rule 403 as a means
of assuring fundamental fairness in the trial process and in so doing
protecting against due process violations in the application of the rules of
evidence.272
This reading of the rules of evidence dovetails with the objectives of
the rules which call on courts to construe the rules to “promote the
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and
securing a just determination.”273 The rules are thus intended to adapt with
advances in knowledge so as to safeguard the integrity of the trial process.
A finding that police-generated lay witness testimony presents lesser
risks of unreliability might not justify exclusion. Such a finding would still
be useful to the trial court in fashioning jury instructions that could be given
during or after trial or in admitting expert testimony. The drafters
envisioned that courts would weigh the efficacy of giving jury instructions
during trial against the option of exclusion.274
268

State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 937 (N.J. 2011).
Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1512 (2005).
270
Id. at 1513.
271
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 185 at 279 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
272
See Orenstein, supra note 269, at 1517–18.
273
FED. R. EVID. 102.
274
See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (“In reaching a decision whether to
exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.”).
269
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Gatekeeping for police-generated lay witness testimony would provide
more effective protection against wrongful conviction than the present free
admission of the testimony under the hearsay rules. All three types of
police-generated lay witness testimony addressed herein involve the
admission of hearsay statements. Prosecutors offer the testimony of police
officers and informants who testify to the defendant’s incriminating
statements, and eyewitnesses testify to their own previous statements
identifying the defendant.275 A defendant’s incriminating statements are
admitted as “[a]n [o]pposing [p]arty’s [s]tatement”;276 an eyewitness’s
testimony about an earlier statement identifying the defendant is admitted
as a “statement [that] . . . identifies a person.”277 Normally, the rule against
hearsay bars witnesses from testifying to statements previously made “out
of court” by themselves or others when offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.278 The rule against hearsay rests on reliability grounds.279
However, the rule recognizes many exceptions for hearsay bearing indicia
of trustworthiness.280 Unlike other hearsay exceptions, a party’s own
statements (previously called “admissions”) and statements of identification
are categorically admissible despite the fact that they possess absolutely no
guarantees of trustworthiness.281 With regard to admissions, these are
admitted instead on the ground that the maker of the statements is a party to
the litigation (here, the defendant), so the party can simply explain or refute

275

See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
277
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
278
See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”).
279
The rule against hearsay rests on four principal trustworthiness concerns, which arise
from the fact that the speaker of the statement is not the person testifying. First, the speaker
may have misperceived the condition or event in question, so the witness’s testimony may be
inaccurate. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 8.2, at 695. Second, the
speaker may have had a bad memory about the condition or event at issue. Id. at 695–96.
Third, the speaker may not have been sincere about what happened but may have been
shading the truth or blatantly lying. Id. at 696. Fourth, the speaker may have misspoken or
misunderstood. Id.
280
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 272, § 246, at 375.
281
In a somewhat confusing manner, the hearsay rules have endeavored to make the
exception for these forms of hearsay so strong that they designate admissions of a party
opponent and statements of identification as “not hearsay” even though they fit the general
definition of hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d). The designation as “not hearsay” is
understood to take these statements outside of the bar against hearsay. For other forms of
evidence, the rules simply provide an exception to the rule. See FED. R. EVID. 803–804. See
also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 271, § 254, at 393.
276
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the statements.282 When offered without reliability guarantees against a
defendant in a criminal case, the defendant is put in a position where she
either has to waive the privilege against self-incrimination and take the
witness stand to refute the validity of the admissions or decline to testify
and find other means of challenging the evidence.283 Many defendants elect
not to testify because doing so would expose them to crippling
impeachment on the basis of their prior crimes.284 Thus, the fail-safe
envisioned by the admissions doctrine actually puts the innocent defendant
between a rock and a hard place: either sacrifice the privilege against selfincrimination or sacrifice the ability to directly challenge highly persuasive
yet unreliable evidence. Natapoff notes that innocent defendants with
criminal records are most at risk of wrongful conviction and may even feel
pressured to plead guilty although innocent to avoid harsher punishment if
convicted at trial.285
The exception for statements of identification may be said to rest on
notions of trustworthiness, but here the “trustworthiness” of the prior
statement of identification is measured solely by comparison to highly
suggestive in-court identifications.286 Typically, a witness will have
identified the defendant at some point prior to trial as part of the police
investigation. The rule reflects a judgment that witnesses should be
allowed to relate prior identifications and not be limited to highly
suggestive and unreliable in-court identifications.287
The Advisory
Committee’s Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence find prior
identifications to be more trustworthy because they are “made at an earlier
time under less suggestive conditions.”288 Prior identifications, being made
closer in time to the crime, will be more accurate than those done later in
282

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 271, § 254 at 393–94; MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 8.27, at 767–68.
283
Necessitating a defendant’s waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination weakens
the privilege as a protection for the innocent. The privilege “constitutes one part, but an
important part, of our accusatorial system which requires that no criminal punishment be
imposed unless guilt is established by a large quantum of especially reliable evidence”
produced by the government. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 271, § 115, at 179.
284
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 6.29, at 492–93.
285
NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 80.
286
See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV.
451, 462–63 (2012) (discussing the traditional preference for evidence of out-of-court
identification, as opposed to in-court identification testimony).
287
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 8.26, at 764–65. It should be noted that
witnesses typically also provide an in-court identification, in addition to testifying to the outof-court identification. Indeed, even in the rare case when a court excludes an out-of-court
identification, courts still allow the witness to make an in-court identification. For a critique
of this rule, see Garrett, supra note 286, at 463–64.
288
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note.
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time, such as at the trial.289 However, the notion that they are made “under
less suggestive conditions” than an in-court identification does not hold up
to scrutiny. For one thing, the prior identification may have been made at a
one-person show-up, which is just as suggestive as in-court identification.
Most likely, the drafters had photo arrays and live lineups in mind, but even
these have been shown to be highly suggestive if not conducted according
to best practices.290
Trustworthiness is also enhanced by the fact that the witness must
testify and be subject to cross-examination. 291 However, while demeanor
evidence and cross-examination normally provide some opportunity for
jurors to assess the credibility of a witness’s testimony, here credibility is
not an issue. The witnesses are “credible” in the sense of providing
testimony they believe to be true; they are simply mistaken. Studies and
DNA exonerations prove quite clearly that cross-examination is an
insufficient means to refute the reliability of a misidentification.292
The traditional application of the hearsay rules as the only evidentiary
screen for police-generated lay witness testimony can no longer be justified.
Trial courts can invoke Rules 701, 403, and 104(a) as authority for an
enhanced gatekeeping role.293 Daubert made this same argument with
289

See generally Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Forgetting the Once-Seen Face:
Estimating the Strength of an Eyewitness’s Memory Representation, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL: APPLIED 139, 142 (2008) (providing a meta-analysis of fifty-three “facial memory
studies” showing that memory strength weakens as time passes).
290
See supra note 130.
291
The rule itself actually allows for third parties to testify to the witness’s prior
identification, without necessitating that the witness testify. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 222, § 8.26, at 766. The Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford, however,
requires as a condition of admissibility that the witness be subject to cross-examination by
the defendant in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. See supra note 222.
292
See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1516.
293
A more recent Supreme Court decision further supports the appropriateness of
judicial oversight of evidentiary reliability under Rule 403. In Holmes v. South Carolina, the
Court addressed the constitutionality of a state rule excluding defense evidence of a third
party’s guilt. 547 U.S. 319, 323 (2006). Holmes offered the testimony of several witnesses
who placed another man, Jimmy McCaw White, in the victim’s neighborhood on the
morning of the attack, as well as four other witnesses who would testify that White had
either admitted his guilt or acknowledged that Holmes was innocent. The South Carolina
evidence rules prevented the defense from offering this testimony, while the rules allowed
the prosecution to offer witness testimony placing Holmes near the victim’s home within an
hour of the killing. The rule excluded evidence of a third party’s guilt “where there is strong
evidence of [a defendant’s] guilt, especially where there is strong forensic evidence.” Id. at
329 (quoting State v. Holmes, 361 S.C. 333, 342 (2004)).
The United States Supreme Court overturned Holmes’s conviction, finding that the South
Carolina rule violated his right to present a defense. Id. at 331. However, the decision does
not require that all evidence of third-party guilt must be admitted. Instead, the Court
suggests that the better approach in Holmes’s case would have been to evaluate the proffered
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respect to scientific evidence.294 In fact, the failure to exclude evidence that
presents heightened risks of unfair prejudice is grounds for reversal. In Old
Chief v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court found that the lower
court had abused its discretion in failing to exclude on Rule 403 grounds
relevant and otherwise admissible evidence offered to prove an element of
the offense.295 In that case, the concern was that the evidence created an
unnecessary risk of unfair prejudice that could lead the jury to act on the
basis of emotion and convict on this improper ground.296 The rules of
evidence empower the courts to screen evidence to ensure that the jury
hears evidence that not only is relevant but also will not lead the jury to
decide the case on improper grounds.297
For police-generated lay witness testimony, extensive studies show
that these types of evidence have a powerful effect on juries and that
juries—employing only “common sense”—are not effective in evaluating
the reliability of such evidence.298 Wrongful convictions also bring to light
the fact that jurors may not appreciate the suggestiveness or coercive effects
of certain police practices. In a related study, most lay people were shown
to be incapable of identifying a leading question.299 Further, “scientific
research show[s] that jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors
and that the effect of many factors on eyewitness accuracy is not a matter of
testimonial evidence under the balancing approach of Rule 403. Id. at 329. The Court
explained:
While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no
legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, wellestablished rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is
outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential
to mislead the jury.

Id. at 326. The Court implicitly faulted the South Carolina rule, which did not require the
trial judge to “focus on the probative value or the potential adverse effects of admitting the
defense evidence of third-party guilt.” Id. at 329. Thus, the Court advocated a case-by-case
balancing approach under Rule 403 to determining the admissibility of proffered lay
testimony in a case in which a state rule called for excluding the evidence on reliability
grounds.
294
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
295
519 U.S. 172, 177–78 (1997).
296
Id. at 191–92.
297
Cf. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(discussing the importance of judicial gatekeeping in toxic tort cases in order that “courts
administer the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . to achieve the ‘end[s]’ that the Rules
themselves set forth, not only so that proceedings may be ‘justly determined,’ but also so
‘that the truth may be ascertained’”).
298
For a thorough discussion of how jurors lack the ability to evaluate the reliability of
eyewitness identifications, confessions, and informant testimony, see Findley, supra note 32,
at 624.
299
See McMurtrie, supra note 214, at 1285.
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common sense.”300 Even when courts try to correct for these deficiencies
by allowing expert testimony, other studies show jurors tend to be
“skeptical of experts, especially defense experts, whose testimony goes
against what they consider simple common sense.”301
Since eyewitnesses are normally honestly mistaken and often highly
confident when they testify, jurors have an even harder time evaluating the
reliability of an identification. In some cases, both the investigating officer
and the eyewitness may act with diligence and good faith in trying to obtain
an accurate identification, and yet the identification may still be
erroneous.302 The use of suggestive procedures, confirmatory feedback, and
the process of pretrial preparation all serve to increase a witness’s level of
confidence in the accuracy of the identification. Thus, if the primary
proficiency of a jury is to evaluate witness “credibility,” mistaken
eyewitnesses present a particular challenge because their testimony is
honest and confident, but totally wrong.
Police officers who obtain false incriminating statements from a
suspect also testify honestly, and most likely confidently. Moreover, they
testify in uniform, which undoubtedly adds some measure of credibility in
the minds of most jurors. Thus, false statements present similar challenges
for jurors who are asked to determine witness “credibility” and are not
trained to evaluate the special risks of interrogation practices, especially as
they apply to vulnerable suspects.
Indeed, studies also show that jurors do not believe that interrogation
tactics are likely to elicit false confessions,303 so there is a tendency toward
overreliance on confession evidence.304 For this reason, a confession
obtained under circumstances likely to produce false statements will tend
not to be rejected by the jury and will be extremely prejudicial to the
defense. Suspects who confess falsely sometimes do so because the
interrogation process so confuses them that they come to believe that they
must be guilty when they confess.305 In these cases, even videotapes of the
300

See Wise, Fishman & Safer, supra note 1, at 453.
See id. at 453–54.
302
See id. at 437–39, 454–55 (discussing good faith conduct of police and eyewitnesses
in the erroneous identification of Ronald Cotton in a North Carolina rape case).
303
See Iris Blandon-Gitlin, Katheryn Sperry & Richard A. Leo, Jurors Believe
Interrogation Tactics Are Not Likely to Elicit False Confessions: Will Expert Testimony
Inform Them Otherwise?, 16 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 1 (2010).
304
Bringing Reliability Back In, supra note 131, at 524 (citing Steven A. Drizin &
Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV.
891, 1003 (2004) and Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998)).
305
See LEO, supra note 10, at 210–11 (addressing persuaded false confessions).
301
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identification process or of the interrogation may not prevent error. If
jurors are supposed to determine whether a person’s statement is credible,
i.e., honest, then these statements would pass muster.
Finally, when police informants testify falsely, jurors also tend to
credit their testimony, most likely minimizing the effects of police tactics
that may tempt or coerce the informants to commit perjury.306 Again,
wrongful convictions have shown jurors to have difficulty determining the
reliability of informant testimony. Courts are in a position to evaluate the
adequacy of discovery about the informant’s background, including any
prior history of informing, and to determine the degree to which the police
may have created incentives likely to cause a person to commit perjury.307
Courts might even be receptive to allowing defense experts to testify at a
pretrial reliability hearing regarding the dangers of informant testimony.
Judges are already tasked with making judgments about the
admissibility of evidence such as police-generated lay witness testimony.
Rule 104(a) gives courts a gatekeeping function for questions of evidentiary
admissibility.308 Indeed, the courts perform this function in passing on the
constitutionality of confessions and eyewitness identifications. The hearsay
rules, which clearly admit out-of-court statements identifying a person or
statements made by an opposing party, render any hearsay objection
pointless. If there were such a non-frivolous hearsay objection to be made,
the decision would be left solely to the court under the operation of Rule
104.
One might imagine a different set of hearsay rules that actually
required courts to determine whether the statements were obtained in such a
way as to render the statements trustworthy. Our growing awareness of the
reliability problems with police-generated lay witness testimony justifies
the adoption of new hearsay rules of this type. Any hearsay rules that
would require these types of testimony to demonstrate guarantees of
trustworthiness would require trial courts to make the determination.
Courts routinely pass judgment on whether witness statements fit
various hearsay exceptions, and these determinations require courts to
evaluate the circumstances under which witnesses made their statements.
306

See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 77. Natapoff notes that innocent people with criminal
associations or criminal records are at special risk of targeting by lying informants because
“law enforcement and jurors alike are predisposed to believe in their guilt.” Id. at 72.
307
Natapoff analogizes police informants to expert witnesses. She argues that both types
of witnesses are paid for their testimony, they purport to have a unique type of insider
information, and their reliability can be difficult for jurors to evaluate. Id. at 195.
308
Rule 104(a) provides: “The court must decide any preliminary question about whether
a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court
is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.” FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
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For example, the hearsay exception for excited utterances applies to the
statements of children who are victims of abuse.309 These statements are
typically made to adult relatives, social service workers, or physicians who
are called to testify at trial. Under the rule, the courts must determine
whether the statement was “made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement [caused by the startling event or condition].”310 The
reliability justification for an exception to the hearsay rule is that “a
condition of excitement . . . temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and
produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.”311 It is beyond
peradventure that the task belongs to trial courts to determine the state of
mind of the declarant, the child victim, to determine whether the child
uttered the statement under circumstances that provide guarantees of
trustworthiness. Moreover, trial courts have relied on their knowledge of
child development regarding the reactions of young children to sexual
assault in finding that the excitement or alarm caused by such an event will
be prolonged in younger children as opposed to adults.312 Although not
specifically required as elements of the excited utterance exception, courts
have also noted other indicia of reliability, such as corroborating evidence
of injury to the child and the fact that the child exhibits knowledge of
sexual matters usually unknown to children of that age.313 Countless
similar examples can be given of the traditional fact-finding done by trial
courts in performing evidentiary gatekeeping to determine whether
evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under various hearsay
exceptions. 314
Thus, Rule 104(a) places on trial courts the primary responsibility for
determining the admissibility of almost all forms of evidence.315 To be
309

See FED. R. EVID. 803(2); see, e.g., United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th
Cir. 1993) (holding that hearsay statements of child victim of sexual assault were admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2)).
310
Id.
311
FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note.
312
See, e.g., Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 504 (6th Cir. 2003). In Bugh, the Third
Circuit noted a “clear judicial trend in Ohio to recognize a liberalization of the requirements
for an excited utterance when applied to young children victimized by sexual assaults.” Id.
(quoting State v. Bugh, No. 594, 1991 WL 38013, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. March 14, 1991).
The Sixth Circuit also commented approvingly of the Ohio appellate court’s reliance on
another of its decisions, in which it found the “‘limited reflective powers of a three-year-old’
and the lack of motive or reflective capacities to prevaricate the circumstances of an attack,
as supporting the trustworthiness of a child’s communications to others.” Id. (citing State v.
Wagner, 508 N.E.2d 164, 167 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986)).
313
Id.; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 8.36, at 808.
314
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 1.10, at 31–37.
315
Rule 104(b) carves out a narrow set of issues as to which the jury is said to make final
determinations of “admissibility.” The types of issues include evidence that is conditionally
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admissible, hearsay statements such as eyewitness testimony, police
testimony about a suspect’s interrogation, and informant testimony should
carry circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The task of determining
reliability would fall to the trial courts in the course of determining
admissibility. Unfortunately, the hearsay rules fail to provide any check for
reliability, but this does not relieve the court of providing such reliability
screening upon request.
In sum, Rules 701 and 403 grant trial courts the discretion to conduct
hearings to determine the admissibility of evidence that is both powerful
and hard for jurors to evaluate for reliability. The refusal to exercise that
discretion in conducting reliability hearings for police-generated lay witness
testimony should constitute an abuse of discretion.
C. ASSESSING THE RELIABILITY OF POLICE-GENERATED WITNESS
TESTIMONY

Each of the three types of police-generated lay witness testimony
considered here presents different types of contamination risks, different
considerations regarding proper documentation, and other distinct
considerations regarding subject vulnerabilities and suggestive or coercive
practices. Thus, in ruling on admissibility, courts would need to consider
these different factors and the degree to which each bears on reliability for
the particular type of evidence at issue.
As a general matter, we can identify four critical issues that should be
addressed for each type of evidence.
First, the record of the witness’s statement must be adequate. Did the
police videotape the entirety of the interrogation, the interview with the
eyewitness, or the interview with the informant? Did they photograph or
videotape the lineup, photo array, or show-up?
Second, the record must show that the witness’s statement is not
contaminated or otherwise tainted. Did the police use suggestive or
coercive means in obtaining an eyewitness’s identification, a suspect’s
confession, or an informant’s testimony? Was a blind administrator used to
conduct the identification procedure? Did the police provide so great an
inducement to a potential informant as to create an undue risk of perjury?
Third, the witness must not have been especially prone to making a
false statement. To what extent was the eyewitness, suspect, or informant
vulnerable to police suggestion or coercion due to youth, intellectual

relevant, authenticity, and whether a witness has sufficient personal knowledge. See id.
§ 1.13, at 45–49. None of these issues can be said to have a bearing on a reliability
assessment of police-generated lay witness testimony.
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disability, mental illness, risk of deportation or prosecution, trauma or fear
induced by crime victimization, etc.?
Fourth, other evidence must corroborate the witness’s statement. Are
other indicators of trustworthiness present, such as reliable corroborating
evidence on the issue for which the testimony is offered? Did the
interrogation or informant statement lead to new evidence such as stolen
items or a murder weapon, for example? If an eyewitness identification is
offered, to what extent does the initial description of the subject match the
characteristics of the defendant? Do other factors such as the presence of a
weapon or high stress indicate that the identification may be unreliable?
Obviously, each type of evidence presents different dangers, and
experts have outlined more refined sets of best practices to guard against
those dangers.
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Henderson provides an
excellent roadmap for lower courts in how to conduct a pretrial reliability
hearing for eyewitness identification testimony.316 Upon motion by the
defense, trial courts should hold pretrial hearings to consider all relevant
factors that have a bearing on the reliability of eyewitness identification.
The court’s decision catalogues all the relevant “estimator” variables that
courts should consider, such as whether the witness made the viewing under
high stress, whether a weapon was visible during a brief encounter, the
witness’s age, whether the witness was highly intoxicated, and whether the
witness and defendant were of different races, among numerous others.317
Courts should consider “system variables” (variables under the control of
the state) including whether a live or photo lineup was conducted following
“blind” procedures, whether the witness was given proper pre-lineup
instructions, whether the live or photo lineup was properly constructed of
look-alikes and a minimum of five fillers, whether the administrator
avoided giving confirmatory feedback, whether the witness’s confidence
level in the identification was recorded, and whether a witness was asked to
view a suspect more than once during an investigation.318 With regard to
show-ups, the court determined that show-ups held more than two hours
after an event present a heightened risk of misidentification, and
administrators should provide instructions to witnesses prior to all showups. Overall, the court expressed a preference for lineups but did not forbid
show-ups under these circumstances.319 Consistent with its prior decisions,
316
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 920–21 (N.J. 2011); see also State v. Chen, 27
A.3d 930 (N.J. 2011) (companion case applying Henderson under state rules of evidence to
eyewitness identifications tainted by private-party suggestiveness).
317
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22.
318
Id. at 895.
319
Id. at 903–04.
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identification administrators are required to “make a full record—written or
otherwise—of the witness’ statement of confidence once an identification is
made.”320
The Henderson decision limits a defendant’s right to such a hearing to
only those cases that involve suggestiveness. If a case does involve
suggestiveness (a system variable), the lower courts are instructed to
consider both estimator and system variables. At the hearing, “a defendant
can cross-examine eyewitnesses and police officials and present witnesses
and other relevant evidence linked to system and estimator variables.”321
Presumably, the defendant might be permitted to call expert witnesses at the
hearing if appropriate. If only estimator variables are raised, then the
defendant is not entitled to a hearing.322 Given the substantially broader
considerations as compared to the previous due process analysis, the court
also found that defendants were entitled to greater pretrial discovery.323 To
prevail, defendants must meet the high burden of demonstrating that the
identification poses “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.”324 Even in cases in which the identification is admitted,
however, the ruling envisions an expanded use of jury instructions, both at
the end of the trial and during the trial.325
The Henderson framework will be criticized by some for not going far
enough and by others for going too far. In general, however, it gives
substance to the proposal made in this Article that courts should conduct
pretrial reliability hearings for police-generated lay witness testimony such
as identifications, confessions, and informant testimony. State supreme
courts can implement such hearings on a statewide basis by adapting their
320

Id. at 900.
Id. at 920.
322
A defendant has the initial burden to show evidence of suggestiveness that could lead
to mistaken identification. Id. at 916–17. Thus, reliability concerns based only on estimator
variables—no matter to what extent those variables indicate the identification is unreliable—
do not entitle a defendant to a hearing under this ruling. The court justified this limitation in
part on pragmatic concerns about overwhelming the court system with demands for hearings
and on the preference for judicial oversight in matters over which the police might be
deterred from acting improperly. Id. at 923–24. The court also relied on a notion (refuted in
this Article) that jurors, and not trial courts, should engage in fact-finding regarding the
reliability of a witness’s statements. Id. at 923. Ironically, the court states that it would be
inappropriate for a trial court to find an identification unreliable solely on the ground, for
example, that the witness was under “‘too much’ stress.” Id. But this is precisely the type of
fact that courts decide all the time in determining whether a witness made a statement while
still under the stress of an event so as to qualify as an “excited utterance.” See supra notes
310–12 and accompanying text.
323
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922–23.
324
Id. at 920.
325
Id. at 925. As a result, the court saw a reduced need for expert witnesses at trial. Id.
321
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due process provisions in the manner done in New Jersey. Legislatures
might also provide a statutory framework for such hearings. At the end of
the day, however, the rules of evidence provide trial courts with the
discretion to conduct extensive pretrial reliability screening for hearsay
evidence, and they require courts to apply the rules so as to promote the
growth and development of the law of evidence and safeguard the integrity
and fairness of the trial process.
D. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING

The jury system gives lay people an important participatory role,
designed to protect the accused, in the criminal justice system. The
theoretical basis for the jury trial is that jurors serve as a bulwark to protect
against oppressive misuse of the prosecution power by the government.326
By screening evidence for reliability, judges enhance the ability of the jury
to protect the interests of the defendant. The jury’s purpose, after all, is to
protect the “fairness of the proceeding,”327 and excluding unreliable
prosecution evidence does not in any way interfere with the defendant’s
right to have the jury render a verdict on the facts.328 As trials are currently
structured, courts may refuse to enter a judgment of guilt if it is contrary to
the great weight of the evidence, which may take into account the
credibility of witnesses, but a judge may not convict when a jury finds the
defendant not guilty. If a witness’s testimony or the confession of a
defendant is so tainted by suggestion or coercion as to render it unreliable,
judges already have the authority to set aside a guilty verdict.329 Thus, the
trial court’s role as currently defined already gives the courts enormous
discretion in aiding the jury in its role to protect the defendant from an
incorrect verdict. In federal courts and some other jurisdictions, judges are
also empowered to comment to the jury on the weight of the evidence,
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See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA at xiii (1988) (“Thomas Jefferson and
others have seen [the jury] as the public’s line of defense against the state when it acts
oppressively, and Jefferson, for that reason, once declared that the right to a trial by jury was
more precious to the maintenance of a democracy than even the right to vote.”).
327
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES & JURY TRIALS, princ. 1 & cmt.
B, at 1–3 (2005).
328
Recent case law on the right to a jury trial protects the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to have a jury decide factual issues that establish elements of the offense or that
increase the maximum punishment for the offense. See supra note 29.
329
See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 215, at 107 (addressing the possible role of the trial
judge to refuse to enter judgment on a verdict of guilty if a child witness’s statement or
testimony is so tainted by suggestion that a guilty verdict cannot stand, and suggesting that
such a ruling should be rare).
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including factors that bear on the credibility of witnesses, including
eyewitnesses.330
Understanding the factors that diminish the reliability of policegenerated witness testimony is not a matter of common sense. For
example, past studies showed that even judges do not have the expertise to
evaluate the factors that affect an eyewitness identification’s reliability.331
Recent case law suggests at least some efforts by the judiciary to be better
informed.332 The development of such expertise by trial courts would
enable them to make accurate findings at pretrial reliability hearings.
Developing such expertise should already be a goal of judicial training.
Similar training could raise judicial awareness of recurring problems with
confessions and the use of informants as well. Expertise in these three
forms of evidence would equip courts as a practical matter to rule on
motions and to enter judgment on verdicts of guilt. More importantly,
judges need the expertise to fulfill their ethical obligations to ensure the
fairness of the trial process.333 It also goes without saying that it is not
feasible to provide this training to jurors during the course of a trial and
expect individual jurors to develop anything close to genuine expertise.
Judicial findings at pretrial reliability hearings have the advantage of
creating public awareness about the standards of evidentiary reliability
pertaining to police-generated witness testimony. Judicial rulings on the
record also make appellate review possible,334 unlike decisions by
individual juries whose errors cannot be corrected. Appellate review
creates a jurisprudence informed by expert-witness testimony and outside
research that could lead to the development of doctrines consistent with
social science.335 The development of such doctrines can effectively require
330

Id. at 106.
See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 83, at 175 (summarizing survey studies and
concluding that judges are generally insensitive to factors that influence eyewitness
identification accuracy).
332
See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 623–30.
333
See Backus, supra note 43, at 961–71; Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at
632 n.180. Some judges have also invoked their supervisory authority to ensure the fairness
of the adversary system. See id. at 622.
334
Creating a coherent body of law with mandatory appellate review was one of the
goals that animated the development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Susan R.
Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ’s Attack on Federal Judicial “Leniency,” the
Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Criminal Sentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519,
521–22 (2009).
335
See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 633 (addressing state courts that
have engaged in jurisprudential development of eyewitness identifications by taking judicial
notice of social science research and developments in other jurisdictions); cf. Cheng, supra
note 12, at 1281–84 (addressing the importance of independent judicial research to accurate
admissibility decisions on scientific evidence).
331
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the police to follow best practices.336 Legislation has already begun to
move in this direction in many jurisdictions, but the progress has been
slow.337 The judiciary can play an important role as a catalyst for these
necessary changes.
Public judicial pronouncements demanding greater reliability of the
trial process so as to avoid wrongful convictions can also further the
educational goals of the criminal justice system. Courts play an essential
role in giving voice to the values of our society.338 Whereas today the
public trial answers only the question of the defendant’s guilt, pretrial
reliability hearings would provide a public airing of the government’s key
evidence and necessitate a judicial declaration of reliability determined by
reference to best practices. The process would give substance to the values
espoused in the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial.
V. CONCLUSION
One former prosecutor responsible for sending an innocent man to
prison for twenty-seven years sums up the reliability conundrum posed by
faulty, uncorroborated testimonial evidence:
In the criminal justice system, people are being convicted on one-witness cases. And
what this says to me is we’ve got an inherent problem about how many of these cases
we’re getting wrong. And it’s still going on today . . . . My question to everybody
involved in this across the state and across the nation is what are we going to do about
339
this? I don’t know.

Clearly, heartfelt apologies and handwringing are not enough.340
Eyewitness identifications, confessions, and police-informant testimony
336

I have previously written about the important doctrinal breakthroughs at the state
level in the area of eyewitness identifications. See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36,
at 623–30. These breakthroughs have been based on state constitutional law, the court’s
supervisory authority, and state evidence rules. Id. at 622.
337
See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying text.
338
See generally DAVID R. DOW, AMERICA’S PROPHETS: HOW JUDICIAL ACTIVISM MAKES
AMERICA GREAT (2009).
339
John Council, Witnesses to the Prosecution: Current and Former ADAs Who Helped
Convict Exonerated Men Reflect, TEX. LAW., June 9, 2008, at 1 (quoting former Dallas
prosecutor James Fry).
340
Not surprisingly, wrongly convicted persons receive apologies from judges, mistaken
eyewitnesses, and even the true perpetrators. See, e.g., Jennifer Peltz, Imprisoned Man
Falsely Accused of Rape Wins Release and Apology from Judge, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11, 2009, at
1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202436239965&
Imprisoned_Man_Falsely_Accused_of_Rape_Wins_Release_and_Apology_From_Judge;
Judge Apologizes, Ends ‘16-Year Nightmare’: Man Wrongly Convicted of Bludgeoning Wife,
Killing Unborn Child, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1996, at 17, available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-06-22/news/9606220178_1_dianna-d-aiello-kevinlee-green-unsolved-slayings; Rape Victim Apologizes to Wrongfully Convicted Man,
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present serious reliability problems, especially when the evidence is
obtained from vulnerable individuals by coercive or suggestive means. The
rules of evidence have traditionally viewed these types of problematic
evidence as presumptively admissible without necessity for individualized
reliability screening. The process leaves it solely to juries to reject any
unreliable evidence. As the scores of DNA exonerations have shown, these
types of prosecution evidence are fraught with dangers of unreliability that
juries are unable to detect. Indeed, concerns about sentencing innocent
people to death on the basis of faulty evidence has already prompted the
recent abolition of the death penalty in New Mexico and Illinois,341 and the
adoption of the country’s most restrictive death penalty statute in
Maryland.342 Unless we find ways to improve the quality of policegenerated witness testimony, the criminal justice system will continue to
convict the innocent.
The exclusion or limitation of unreliable prosecution evidence protects
the innocent by ensuring the integrity of the trial process. A trial based on
critical and unreliable evidence is simply unfair. It is no wonder that so
many innocent people have been mistakenly convicted. Preventing
wrongful convictions also furthers the important public safety goal of
incapacitating dangerous individuals. As is often noted, when an innocent
person is wrongly convicted, a guilty person remains at large, free to
commit additional crimes.343 Not only do more accurate investigative
procedures prevent miscarriages of justice, but they also lead to the capture
and punishment of the truly guilty individuals who might otherwise escape
apprehension.
WRAL.COM (May 14, 2008), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/2862438/; True
Perpetrator Apologizes to Wrongly Convicted Man, NBC DFW (Apr. 16, 2009),
http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/True-Perpetrator-Apologizes-To-Wrongly-ConvictedMan--.html; see also Abigail Penzell, Apology in the Context of Wrongful Conviction: Why
the System Should Say It’s Sorry, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 145 (2007) (advocating
apology as a psychological tool to promote healing for victim, exonerated individuals, and
the community).
341
See Deanna Bellandi, Lawmakers: Ill. Governor. to Abolish Death Penalty, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 9, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13091185 (reporting that
Illinois had abolished the death penalty and noting that New Mexico had done the same in
2009).
342
See Millemann, supra note 8, at 272–75 (noting that concern about convicting the
innocent was one reason for new restrictions).
343
See e.g., N.Y. STATE JUST. TASK FORCE, http://www.nyjusticetaskforce.com/
mission.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (including in their mission statement “public
safety” and recognizing in their task force description that “[w]rongful convictions . . . allow
the actual perpetrator of the crime to go unpunished”); Causes of Wrongful Conviction, NEW
ENG. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.newenglandinnocence.org/knowledge-center/causes/
(“Nobody benefits from a wrongful conviction—except the real perpetrator who remains
free to commit additional crimes.”).

396

SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON

[Vol. 102

